The German tank problem

[maple_leaf_eh]

Originally Posted by Mike Cecil

The Int estimate values are interesting as this intelligence figure is then used to calculate what it would take to counter that Int estimated production - ie how many tanks are we going to need to combat the 'X' tanks produced by the enemy in the last 12 months, minus what we know we have destroyed?

Such a figuring may well have delayed operations pending an Allied build up to a suitable level to ensure success against what the Intelligence people thought the enemy could field (rather than what they could field).

And where on earth did the intelligence boffins think the Germans were hiding all those tanks??

Mike

I doubt reality entered some peoples' minds.

One complication to the tank number estimates has to battlefield regeneration of losses. We know that Normandy was fought with tank mostly made in 1942 and 43. The resupply depots were staged to replenish losses after the units were withdrawn. The battles in 1944 and 45 were fought with tanks that survived or were knocked out, recovered, repaired and reissued, and with new builds. The introduction of new designs was resisted because of the bother of retraining and establishing parallel lines, and sustaining the momentum of equipping regiments with Shermans. The following link amply details the business of replenishing combat regiments with Shermans http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewconte...00&context=cmh.

In the context of German losses, they invariably lost ground in combat after DDay. Any vehicles knocked out were abandoned on the battlefield, which meant their replenishment calculations could scarcely include salvage and returning tanks to front line units. So, their factories had to be very productive to keep up with demand, regardless of availability estimates.

[Hanno Spoelstra]

Originally Posted by maple_leaf_eh

The following link amply details the business of replenishing combat regiments with Shermans http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewconte...00&context=cmh.

The author, Arthur Gullachsen is a member of MLU. Here is a link to the web page describing his article "No Shortage of Tanks!: The Canadian Army’s System for the Recovery, Repair and Replacement of A and B Vehicles and Major Weapons Systems".

Mr. Gullachsen also wrote Destroying the Panthers: The Effect of Allied Combat Action on I./SS Panzer Regiment 12 in Normandy, 1944. This article argues Allied combat action was responsible for a large percentage of Panthers that were out of action. And like you noted Terry, also the inferior resources of the German tank replacement and repair program were no match for superior Canadian Army practices during 1944.

What also interesting to look at is the cost of manufacturing tanks. Many years ago, I made a web page listing Sherman's 1945 prices, averaging $50,767 across all variants. Recently I came across a chart detailing the WW2 German tank cost: a King Tiger was the equivalent of $320,000, while the most numerous German AFV, the StuG III, cost $33,000.

The Panzer IV was $46,000, which is similar in price and performance to the Sherman tank. So one could argue each combatant got the same "bang for the buck"!

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Source: http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww...onigstiger.php