CAF Service Battalions

[maple_leaf_eh]

The modern way to going to war doesn't work with the service battalion concept (lower case for a reason). As I recall ... the Service Battalions (capitalized) grew out of constraints imposed on the army for post-war German deployments. Sean Maloney's book probably explains the manpower and budget caps from the governments of the day. No general wanted a long logistics tail and a proportionately small number of combat troops. So the 1st, 2nd and 3rd line supports were optimized for small bases and as-mobile-as-possible operations, using the local trains, and keeping the supply lines short. The result was when the CDS asked if Canada could field any sizeable force for the Gulf War, he was embarassed to be told no. Not enough trucks or heavy lift, and not enough technicians.

Fifteen years and a decade of Bosnia experience later, the same mindset was still entrenched. The log commander in Kandahar articulated his frustrations in What the Thunder Said (http://www.dundurn.com/books/what_thunder_said). He also brutally admitted to not being able to track ammunition expenditures well enough when the fight got tough. The field army damn near ran out of 25mm ammunition just as the fight get heaviest. On the lighter side, he was the first to admit fear to his soldiers after coming through a couple of IED or ambushes. 'Clerk, raise a General Allowance Claim. Yes, sir what for? A new pair of shorts. I've soiled the ones I'm wearing.'