25-pdr in Korea

[Dan Martel]

Mike C, good to hear from you again.

As it happens I'm reading The D-Day Dodgers by Daniel Dancocks and came upon the following reference. Just to set the quote into context, it is December, 1944, and I Canadian Corps is conducting its last offensive before the onset of winter weather in the Po Valley of northern Italy. After a disastorous first battle under his command, the new Corps Commander (Charles Foulkes) is planning a set piece battle to force a crossing of the Lamone River.

The first attempt had lasted less than 12 hours before the Canadians were forced to withdraw, losing the better parts of the Royal Canadian Regiment and the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment in the process. Both battalion commanders, along with the commander of the 1st Brigade, were sacked.

After a new attempt to force a crossing of the Lamone, the Corps will have to cross four canals before reaching its objective, the Senio River. Both of the rivers and all four of the canals had steep banks, high dykes, and were in full flow due to the autumn rains. Plus, of course, the Germans.

At the same time, the First Division was making amends for its earlier setback on the Lamone. In sharp contrast to the silent attack employed by the Fifth Division, the First employed a massive and imaginative thirty-minute bombardment, which ceased for twenty minutes, then resumed in the hope of catching the defenders in the open. This program was orchestrated by the division's chief gunner, Bill Ziegler, who had introduced another innovation. With the enemy taking refuge behind the floodbanks of the rivers and canals, there was a need for more plunging fire, like that of mortars. Since 25-pounders could fire at no more that a 45-degree angle, Ziegler had the trails of the guns dug into the ground, which increased the angle of fire. There were no range tables for this type of shooting, but "we had a lot of mathematical brains," says Ziegler (himself a civil engineer in peacetime), "and we corrected them by actual fire."

Interview between Ziegler and the author, 1989.

It looks like this technique worked and that the shells detonated. Unfortunately there's no reference as to whether or not this was used in North West Europe.

Further to gun and howitzer trajectories, the following quote highlights the danger to troops in the front line from their own artillery, even if the surveying is done correctly. This occurred at the start of the first, and ultimately unsuccessful, crossing of the Lamone.

The operation started poorly for the Hasty Ps (The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment). The assault companies of both battalions were instructed to keep away from the river bank during the ten-minute preliminary bombardment by the medium guns. This precaution was necessary because the mediums fired their shells in a flat trajectory, and it was almost certain that there would be some hits on the Canadian side. However, the two companies of Hasty Ps moved right up to the embankment, thanks to the darkness and fog and their unreliable Italian maps. At 0500 hours, when the bombardment began, one Canadian shell after another smashed into them; by the time the mediums ceased firing after ten minutes, the Hasty Ps were a battered bloody mess. Forty-eight of them had been either killed or wounded; the survivors were in a state of shock.

War Diary of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment. December, 1944.

Best laid plans, and all that.

Dan.

[motto]

Thanks Dan, hard information on artillery usage seems hard to come by but it now appears there was a precedence to what those fellows were doing in Korea which to my eyes doesn't appear to be a combat situation, more of a test firing or tickle up? The situation just doesn't seem that serious.
Unfortunately Bill Ziegler doesn't give any information on what angle they were firing at and we will probably never know if all firings at that angle resulted in detonation.
Perhaps the question of projectile attitude hasn't been asked because the majority of shells do detonate and it's of no more than technical interest.

David

[Barry Churcher]

Gilles, I will send info via PM on the weekend.
Barry

[chrisgrove]

Originally Posted by Dan Martel

Mike C, good to hear from you again.

As it happens I'm reading The D-Day Dodgers by Daniel Dancocks and came upon the following reference. Just to set the quote into context, it is December, 1944, and I Canadian Corps is conducting its last offensive before the onset of winter weather in the Po Valley of northern Italy. After a disastorous first battle under his command, the new Corps Commander (Charles Foulkes) is planning a set piece battle to force a crossing of the Lamone River.

The first attempt had lasted less than 12 hours before the Canadians were forced to withdraw, losing the better parts of the Royal Canadian Regiment and the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment in the process. Both battalion commanders, along with the commander of the 1st Brigade, were sacked.

After a new attempt to force a crossing of the Lamone, the Corps will have to cross four canals before reaching its objective, the Senio River. Both of the rivers and all four of the canals had steep banks, high dykes, and were in full flow due to the autumn rains. Plus, of course, the Germans.



It looks like this technique worked and that the shells detonated. Unfortunately there's no reference as to whether or not this was used in North West Europe.

Further to gun and howitzer trajectories, the following quote highlights the danger to troops in the front line from their own artillery, even if the surveying is done correctly. This occurred at the start of the first, and ultimately unsuccessful, crossing of the Lamone.



Best laid plans, and all that.

Dan.

You should try 'The Regiment' by Farley Mowat, who was an officer in the Hasty Ps. The Ist Brigade was warned at very short notice to assault across the Lamone, after the first assault by 3rd Brigade attack had failed. The medium artillery was tasked to concentrate on houses immediately behind the high dykes on the far side of the Lamone, targets suited only to 25 pounders which could carry out high angle shoots, despite the objections of the artillery officers to the brigadier. There was insufficient time to give out orders properly. The acting CO of the Hasty Ps (the CO had been ordered by the brigadier to ensure the 2ic commanded for this attack - and three of the company commanders were inexperienced)) having no time at all for a recce, chose his start line as a ditch well back from the river, prominently marked on the only maps available, but which turned out to be visible only on the map, with the result that the leading two companies moved on (in the dark) right up to the friendly side dyke, where they were predictably clobbered by the medium artillery. The remaining two companies, further back, were then ordered to continue the assault, leaving the battalion with no reserves to counter the inevitable counter attack. No plan was instigated by brigade to get tanks, or even anti-tank guns across the river. If ever there was a disaster orchestrated by brigade, division and Corps, this was it. The casualties, of course, were all at battalion level.

As a minor detail, Stan Ketcheson, the acting CO of the Hasty Ps, was not sacked as he was wounded by mortars shortly after the battle.

Oh, and 67 of the Hasty Ps were killed, seriously injured or captured in that battle.

Chris