Chevys of the Indian Long Range Patrol

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

This is what happened to the intended Bombay deliveries:

To illustrate the urgency of the demand for Canadian trucks, reference is made to the M. of S. contracts: Supply/Mechanical [abbreviated ‘S.M.’ or ‘S/M’] 2002 to 2006 which were placed in June 1940 in Ottawa. S/M. 2002 was intended to cover 3,500 15-cwt. Fords for Bombay, and the same number of Chevrolets for England ; S/M 2003 1,500 30-cwt. Fords for Bombay and 1,500 Chevrolets for England ; S/M 2004 was for 3-Tonners, 5,742 Ford trucks, 66 Ford Stores, 86 Wreckers and 86 Machinery for England , and S/M 2005 [Bombay] and 2006 [England] covered 4,787 Chevrolet trucks split 3,829 for Bombay and 958 for England, with 57 Stores, Wreckers and Machinery for Bombay and 14 of each for England. The bodies and chassis were to be boxed separately and marked accordingly after the case number: one body and one chassis were required to be shipped together to form one unit. By 28 August, this had all changed with 9,000 of the 21,000 ordered going to Egypt and Mombasa on the instructions from Ottawa : S/M 2002 required 3,000 Ford 15-cwt. for Egypt , 500 for Mombasa, and 3,500 Chevrolets for England; 2003 became 1,200 30-cwt. Fords for Egypt and 300 for Mombasa, with 1,500 Chevrolets for England ; 2004 was for 5,742 3-Ton Ford trucks plus 86 of each of Stores, Wreckers and Machinery , and finally 2005 became 4,787 Chevrolet 3-Ton trucks split 3,150 for Egypt, 670 for Mombasa and 967 for England, with 71 Stores, Wreckers and Machinery split 50 for Egypt, 10 for Mombasa and 11 for England in each case. The W.O. Census shows that S/M 2006 was issued for 30-cwt. 4 x 2 G.S. [General Service] trucks, totalling 193 units. Further, S/M 2002 totalled 3,211 registered Chevrolet units with 1,500 Chevrolets under S/M 2003.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

I am now checking my papers from a duty filing cabinet but here's the balance for you for the moment:

The initial suggestion for the re-allocation of the Bombay deliveries was because the W.O. hurriedly changed priority in August 1940 for the Middle East to be supplied, with vehicles being issued to the Indian Army in Egypt. However the evidence now shows that the Australian Infantry Force [A.I.F.] in Egypt were issued with trucks and lorries from these earliest British orders in addition to the British and Indian forces. Confirmation of the delivery in January 1941 of the ‘Egypt’ deliveries appears to come from a M. of S. note of 31 January 1941 stating that the War Office had decided to establish four unit plants in the Middle East for assembly of vehicles purchased ‘in America’ {sic} and shipped direct to the Middle East; further that vehicles were already being delivered and the provision of assembly plants was a matter of urgency. Permission was sought to spend £75,000 or $300,000 for five 1 or 2-ton revolving caterpillar-type cranes, trailers for the cranes, petrol-engined battery-charging plant, petrol-engined air compressor plant, sets of hand tools and 9 5-ton platform lorries and spare parts multiplied by four for each plant

[Lang]

David,

This is very interesting.

I wonder if the diversion to the Australians was a finger in the dyke attempt to put off the day UK became US Dollar (and in fact gold) bankrupt, which would have been about this time. I think Australia had used up most of its US dollar credits also but still had gold reserves which could be spent for the great cause.

India on the other hand would have been milked for every last dollar and international gold credit by the Home Government and had none to pay GM and Ford.

GM and Ford had no illusions about the credit-worthiness of their customer and it was only good business sense for them to demand cash on delivery.

Roosevelt's Lend Lease saved the day and the rest is history.

I can see why the Canadians were getting uppity with a threat of being sucked into the British financial quicksand.

This probably bores the rest of the MLU mob but I think it is really fascinating.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

Lang, have a read of my online research paper:

http://www.gmhistorian.btinternet.co...IANDOLLARS.htm

I am wading through papers now not touched for years. This the thing: you note verything down at the time and then nin due course, armed with more information from other sources, it begind to make more sense or answers queries that were not resolved previously.

Whilst I beaver away here's two titbits to make you think:

a) From a 27th June 1940 Memo:

[Colonel N.O.] Carr had also been informed by GM of Canada that they had received an inquiry from Australia for 1,900 4 x 4 “National Defence specification” and was asked what reply GM should give. He claimed he was at a loss to give any constructive advice. This approach plus the British order emphasised the need to “get into maximum production as soon as possible and maintain peak production until the tap is turned off”

My comments in a footnote were:

Note also that the Australian Government were seeking Canadian supplies by direct approach, well before the Ministry of Supply allocated British orders to that Dominion and before they received deliveries destined for Singapore and Malaya that were diverted. The British also make reference to the existing agreement for the purchase of the complete Australian and New Zealand wool clip. It is queried as to how the Canadians were to be paid by way of barter, as a consequence, and therefore were the Canadians happy to accept Australian pounds, which the Americans would not be so accommodating about?

However, may I go off-topic and add these nuggets before I lose the plot:

The trickling tap, though, was possibly suddenly to be fully opened: despite the mistaken belief that the British requirements had to be satisfied from the U.S., there was a change in attitude by mid-July possibly as the shortage of U.S. dollars was noted! In a letter of 31 July 1940 from Carr to the Department of Munitions and Supply “the British” had made a further enquiry regarding the possible production of 39,200 additional vehicles! Consequently Carr queried as to whether the tooling contemplated for 200 vehicles per day was sufficient and the motor industry should review the situation to see whether bottlenecks at that production rate could be relieved with advantage, though they might not be able to do so until tooling for 100 units/day had advanced beyond the state at that time. Carr thought that the aim was 100 units/day but under pressure 125 could be achieved. However, spare parts demand for large orders shortly beforehand was such that the 100 units/day completed vehicles could only be maintained if the outside limit of 125 sets of components could also be maintained As this would preclude elasticity or buffer in production, he suggested that the companies decide whether they could create some reserve capacity greater than then contemplated

b) Priority changed by even mid-August 1940 even whilst the BofB was raging, and thought was being given to the Mid-East as well as the invasion of Europe in 1942:

The requirement to supply the Middle East with vehicles clashed with that of the Canadians’ need to supply their 2nd Division that were beginning to arrive in the United Kingdom, and the problem of equipping them proved a very difficult one. On 20th August 1940 Lieutenant-General McNaughton wrote to the Senior Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters, expressing concern at the supply of equipment for the Division and ancillary troops. He said it appeared to be impossible ‘to obtain either the necessary equipment or any assurance as to when it will be made available; this seems to be due to the apparent division of responsibility of allotment between the War Office and G.H.Q. Home Forces. I feel that the time has arrived when we must insist on positive information and, if no definite assurance of supply of equipment can be given by the War Office, we should consider advising Canada against the despatch of any additional troops to this country until they can be equipped properly’. The Senior Officer was requested to arrange for a meeting ‘with representatives of the War Office who can speak with authority on this matter’. The consequence was a meeting at the War Office on 30th August attended on behalf of Canada and the War Office. General Carr of the W.O. explained that ‘equipment must be placed where it is most needed’ and that large consignments to the Middle East were necessary. To meet these requirements it had been necessary to stop issues to units at home. No Bofors guns were available in England except for A.D.G.B. (Air Defences of Great Britain); all others were going to Haifa and Alexandra. The British officers further mentioned that ‘about 12 divisions are the most that can be maintained in the Middle East owing to transportation and other problems’, and that ‘24 Divisions are in England now in various stages of being equipped’. McNaughton remarked that in view of the information given him he had grave doubts as to whether additional Canadian formations should be sent from Canada in the spring of 1941. However, despite re-allocation of resources to the Middle East, during the early part of 1941 the equipment situation of the 2nd Division improved slowly as a result of increasing Canadian production and provision was made for the 3rd Canadian Division that arrived in the U.K. in the summer of 1941 much better equipped than its predecessors.

[nuyt]

Dont forget my picture collection of Indian Pattern vehicles at:
http://www.network54.com/Forum/33033...ian+WW2+trucks
Enjoy!

[Hanno Spoelstra]

Back to top…

Very interesting to read the writings of the late David Hayward again. All those intricate dealings and global supply chains working in the background to supply the troops with the vehicles they needed. Fascinating.

The vehicles at the top of the page are indeed 1940 Model Chevrolet 1311X3 15-cwt 4x2 trucks.

More information on the Indian Long Range Squadron (ILRS) has since became available, see http://www.lrdg.org/indian-long-range-patrol.html for example.

Plus some footage recently uploaded on YT: https://youtu.be/8EzmdQ5tvQo

[Kuno]

...but I am afraid the newsreel on youtube has nothing to do with the ILRS :-(

[Hanno Spoelstra]

Originally Posted by Hanno Spoelstra

More information on the Indian Long Range Squadron (ILRS) has since became available, see http://www.lrdg.org/indian-long-range-patrol.html for example.

Also see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian...Range_Squadron - I know some of us on here are not a fan of Wikipedia, but at least it gives us a list of useful references on the subject of the ILRS.