Dieppe Visit

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

It has been my ambition to visit Dieppe since I started reading about it at age 12. Last month I was able to visit and offer these pictures of one of Canada's most tragic battles, the raid on August 19, 1942...

My son and I overlooking Dieppe and the beach from the west cliff.

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

Then and now picture from the west headland showing the casino and disabled Churchills of the Calgary tank Regiment. Same shot in 2004, the casino replaced with a pool and a mini-golf.

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

Calgary Tank Regiment Churchills (L to R) 'Blossom', 'Bloody', 'Beefy' and 'Calgary' at high tide after the raid. Same spot in 2004.

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

The town of Pourville to the west of Dieppe (Green Beach) where the South Saskatchewan Regiment and Camerons of Canada landed. My son is seen at the bridge over the River Scie where the Saskatchewan C.O. Col. Merritt won his VC.

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

Puys, a notch in the chalk cliffs a mile east of Dieppe where the Royal Regiment of Canada was destroyed. Incredible folly. Magnificent bravery.

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

Puys, August 19, 1942.

[Tony Smith]

I'm not referring to you in shorts, Bruce! "Then and now" shots are not something we can readily produce here in Australia, and being "on-the-spot" is something we can envy of our European friends (The same could have hardly have been said 60 years ago). The beach at Puys must have sent sent shivers up your spine bearing in mind the WW2 pic. They just go to show that while many of the personalities from those days have now passed on, the locations are still just as recognisable 60 years on and can still tell a mighty story.

[Frank Misztal]

Excellent comparisson photos, Bruce. I wish I was able to visit Europe to see these famous places. My only venture was Vimy Ridge in '97.

BTW, I was 10 years old when I left Belgium. The next time I set foot on Belgian soil was 41 years later. I was involved in the burial of 3 remaining Halifax bomber crew members found in a Belgian bog (1997).

[Garry Shipton (RIP)]

Hi Bruce.Great photos.Reminds me of my stop there on my way to Paris back in July 1973 while touring England & France..The ferry from Newhaven comes into Dieppe just the other side of the jetty shown in photo #2.It goes into the inner harbour just to the right of the buildings to the right side of the photo & docks right next to the train station.My buddy & I had a four hour layover till the next train.We came out of a restaurant & asked a gentleman in french where the Canadian cemetary was.He realized we were Canadian,escorted us to his car & we drove a few miles out of town to the cemetary & escorted us while we viewed the graves.I must admit it was a sobering sight to see how young the boys were.A sobering experience which I must admit brought tears to our eyes.Thanks for the memories.We offered the man a 10 franc note each but he would not accept any recompense.All he said was "Merci Canada" .

[Geoff Winnington-Ball (RIP)]

Bruce,

As you well know as an ex-Royal, 907 of our boys died that fateful day. This is a simple, yet fitting tribute. Thank you.

Geoff

[Waycool]

A pilgrimage that you and your son will remember forever. Thanks for sharing the pics one day I hope to make it over as well.

[Norm Cromie (RIP)]

Again I would like to thank the great effort the MLU puts into the Canadian past of WW2. I need some help completing some of my history memories.
In late spring of 1942 while I was serving with the 48th, a small group of us were told to pack up and then we were shipped to a place called Seaford on the coast. We went in to training with a Royal Comando unit in the exercise of cliff scaling, beach landings etc. I believe we were a part of a first Canadian division organization and our roll was to be a task of scaling cliffs to knock out what I believe was some sort of radio or signal unit that the Germans had on the coast of France. Our commanding officer was a chap named Armstrong and I know we were a mixed bag of first Div. because in my tent we had several Van Doo's Royal 22nd and an officer from the PPCLI who I vaguely remember his name as Lieut. Doosenbury. Very early in August we were told to pack our bags and I was shipped back to my regiment. Shortly after arriving back I read of the terrible disaster at Dieppe. Later I understood that the powers to be did not want to commit anymore than one division and that was the second division. I have searched many records but have never been able to find any information on this unit. Sad to say, when I saw films on the Dieppe landings and what happened to the Royal Comandoes and Ranger battalions attempting to scale the cliffs I realize how lucky I am today to be here.

[Jon Skagfeld]

Originally posted by Bruce Parker
Puys, a notch in the chalk cliffs a mile east of Dieppe where the Royal Regiment of Canada was destroyed. Incredible folly. Magnificent bravery.

Truly humbling pictures.

Both Bruce and I served in the Royal Regiment of Canada (as did Frank Misztal). Bruce, during a recent militaria event, gave me a piece of "chert" stone, from the Puys beach. I was absolutely shattered that he did this for me.

I felt the stone, stroked it, and felt...something. I'm not one to be called psychic or "otherworldly", but... there was an indescribable feeling, perhaps of subliminal "deja vu", that permeated my very being.

Of Dieppe...being a Monarchist, one doesn't criticize one's "family", does one? However, much as I despise the IRA and all it stands for, I can't begrudge the murder of Mountbatten by the IRA. It was that scion of a dysfunctional family who authored and authorized the Dieppe "raid". He is, therefore, a murderer in his own right, having caused the deaths of so many soldiers on 19 Aug 42.

Originally posted by Jon Skagfeld
Of Dieppe...being a Monarchist, one doesn't criticize one's "family", does one? However, much as I despise the IRA and all it stands for, I can't begrudge the murder of Mountbatten by the IRA. It was that scion of a dysfunctional family who authored and authorized the Dieppe "raid". He is, therefore, a murderer in his own right, having caused the deaths of so many soldiers on 19 Aug 42.

I've been here before elsewhere in the forum and said my piece on Dieppe, however, in my mind along with Jon's concise summary, attached to "murderer" I have arrogant, bombastic and incompetent.

R.

[Snowtractor]

...didn't the admiralty and air marshall also have some responsibility? IE the refusal to send a coule of battleships for shore bombardment /support and the same for heavy bombers, the lack there of. Though, Fighter support was fierce as I recall were they withdrawn after losses mounted?
Sean

[Geoff Winnington-Ball (RIP)]

Originally posted by Snowtractor
...didn't the admiralty and air marshall also have some responsibility? IE the refusal to send a coule of battleships for shore bombardment /support and the same for heavy bombers, the lack there of. Though, Fighter support was fierce as I recall were they withdrawn after losses mounted?
Sean

Sean, the two most significant elements of the Dieppe raid are the following, both falling under Mountbatten's purvue as the chief of Combined Operations.

The original operation was designated RUTTER and scheduled for early July. The plan incorporated heavy air and sea bombardment in support, this being deemed critical to success. The troops trained for it, were briefed for it, and were actually aboard ship when the raid was cancelled due to foul weather in the Channel. The soldiers were then released to their normal encampments/duties, RUTTER forgotten as just one more op the staff wallahs couldn't make happen.

Incredibly, within a month, the original plan was reconstituted almost verbatim as JUBILEE. Despite security concerns, as the troops had had a month to talk about it freely. Interestingly, although some postwar research has unearthed unconfirmed reports that the Germans were "expecting us", that has never been established beyond the shadow of a doubt, although it's not beyond one's imagination to suggest it true as the original mantle of secrecy had been wiped away.

Regardless, JUBILEE was RUTTER, with very little modification, and therein lies the second point: the few mods to the original plan were those you mentioned. First, the First Sea Lord declined to send his big ships into the Channel, for two reasons. First, their vulnerability in limited sea-space, and second, removing their potential as 'Tirpitz-stoppers' should that great ship have sallied forth from her Norwegian fjord. What was made available to the raid was a group of elderly destroyers instead.

The raid as designed should have been cancelled there and then, but no.

Compounding that error in judgement was the decision to withdraw the heavy bombers tasked with softening up the port prior to landing. The rationale went that as this was just a raid, not an invasion, they wished to minimize French civilian damage and casualties.

The raid DEFINITELY should have been cancelled at that point, regardless of the prior security and sea support issues. But no. The troops would go into a strongly defended port, without adequate support, and with a good chance that security had ben compromised.

Some say it was Churchill himself who insisted on JUBILEE, as a way of showing the Russians we were actually doing something to harass the Germans in the west. Others believe, as I do, that Mountbatten simply wanted to make a name for himself, to impress the higher-ups that he was accomplishing great things in Combined Ops.

And of course, we all know what happened. It was a fiasco which virtually destroyed a well-trained Canadian infantry division.

To be fair to all, the Canucks have to take a proportion of the blame themselves. McNaughton approved the operation in principle (the original) as it was seen necessary to blood the Canadians who for the most part had been training in England for more than two years already. General Crerar, however, had the final right of approval, and it is suggested that he gave such under pressure from MacKenzie King; I suggest he was, like Mountbatten, playing a political game instead, gambling that casualties would be minimized and the operation termed a success (kind of like buying lottery tickets). In his memoirs, Simonds roundly criticized Crerar for this faulty judgement, and Montgomery himself, while initially in favour of RUTTER as designed, quickly distanced himself as well.

The operation's overall commander, Roberts, KNEW this would not work, but to decline to lead his troops accordingly would simply have resulted in his dismissal; he elected to stay with his men as he knew them and felt he was in the best position to support them himself. At the end of the debacle, he was made the scapegoat by Crerar, Mountbatten & co. That wasn't fair, and I'm sure he would have preferred to die on the beaches with his men.

Finally, the fighter battle over Dieppe was one of the biggest in the entire war, but with the RAF coming out a poor second. Fighter support was NOT pulled, though, and the pilots preformed with great courage; it's just that they were of little help to the poor pongos being slaughtered on the beaches.

It has often been said that what the Allies learned from Dieppe was what guaranteed success at Normandy almost two years later. Nonsense. That was a statement designed to deflect responsibility. The original plan concept, even before RUTTER, acknowledged that a heavily defended port was virtually impregnable to frontal assault...

Originally posted by Geoff Winnington-Ball
Sean, the two most significant elements of the Dieppe raid are the following, both falling under Mountbatten's purvue as the chief of Combined Operations.

The original operation was designated RUTTER and scheduled for early July. The plan incorporated heavy air and sea bombardment in support, this being deemed critical to success. The troops trained for it, were briefed for it, and were actually aboard ship when the raid was cancelled due to foul weather in the Channel. The soldiers were then released to their normal encampments/duties, RUTTER forgotten as just one more op the staff wallahs couldn't make happen.

I wouldn't disagree with Geoff's appraisal but I think it goes further and gets worse.

Interestingly, although some postwar research has unearthed unconfirmed reports that the Germans were "expecting us", that has never been established beyond the shadow of a doubt, although it's not beyond one's imagination to suggest it true as the original mantle of secrecy had been wiped away.

Drawing on the work by Colonel John Hughes-Watson who was in the British Army Intelligence Corps from 1963 to 1993, the original cancellation of RUTTER was largely because of warnings and indications from ULTRA that the Germans did indeed expect an attack and had recognised Dieppe as a strong possibility as a target.

Regardless, JUBILEE was RUTTER, with very little modification, and therein lies the second point: the few mods to the original plan were those you mentioned. First, the First Sea Lord declined to send his big ships into the Channel, for two reasons.

In fact Hughes-Watson describes the situation as squarely a Mountbatten go-it-alone having been piqued that RUTTER was cancelled. Originally Churchill asked Mountbatten to mount a morale-booster and to utilise the Canadian forces cooped-up in SE England and causing mayhem in an attempt to relieve the boredom.

Mountbatten used this as if it were personal authorisation of the highest level and quoted this "authority" whenever meeting an obstacle, however, in some areas of high command he couldn't push his luck and just did without. Officers who mentioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff were deflected by this so-called authority to keep it from them and certain written cancellation in writing.

Had the JCS been involved and tasked with the operation then the full panoply of arms would have been available with the Navy and RAF; plus intelligence from covert beach survey by frogmen, RAF PR input and ULTRA.

The raid as designed should have been cancelled there and then, but no.

As it would have been if Mountbatten hadn't kept playing the Churchill authority card.

The rationale went that as this was just a raid, not an invasion, they wished to minimize French civilian damage and casualties.

A good excuse and covering of the whole Mountbatten deception.

Some say it was Churchill himself who insisted on JUBILEE, as a way of showing the Russians we were actually doing something to harass the Germans in the west.

Post fiasco cover-up.

Others believe, as I do, that Mountbatten simply wanted to make a name for himself, to impress the higher-ups that he was accomplishing great things in Combined Ops.

Much nearer the truth.

To be fair to all, the Canucks have to take a proportion of the blame themselves. McNaughton approved the operation in principle . . . . . . .

Largely these people were either hoodwinked by Mountbatten's deception and/or overawed by his position and royal connection.

It has often been said that what the Allies learned from Dieppe was what guaranteed success at Normandy almost two years later. Nonsense.

More like Bollocks (capital B and two L's).

That was a statement designed to deflect responsibility.

Everything from the official mouth was a cover-up and spin as we would say today. The smugly arrogant Mountbatten (formerly Battenburg but changed as that was too German) was virtually unimpeachable because of his connections although strong rumours abound that one officer did put him on his back in the mess after the "internal" truth came out.

Interestingly after Dieppe Churchill noted, and is a matter of the record:

"Although for many reasons everyone was concerned to make this business look as good as possible, the time has now come when I must be informed more precisely about the military plans."

In a deluge of questions that reveals just what Churchill didn't know about in '42 he continues,

"Who made them? Who approved them? What was Gen Montgomery's part in them? And Gen MacNaughton's part? What is the opinion about the Canadian generals selected by Gen MacNaughton? Did the General Staff check the plan? At what point was VCIGS informed in the Chief of the Imperial General Staff's absence?" (this latter pointing to the fact that Churchill knew that Gen Nye knew nothing about JUBILEE)

(See "Military Intelligence Blunders" ISBN 1 - 84119 - 067 - 5)

R.

[Mark W. Tonner]

The Royal Regiment of Canada Dieppe Memorial Plaque in the Unit lines, Fort York Armouries, Toronto.

Lest We Forget

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