pre Dieppe

[Norm Cromie (RIP)]

Again I would like to thank the great effort the MLU puts into the Canadian past of WW2. I need some help completing some of my history memories.
In late spring of 1942 while I was serving with the 48th, a small group of us were told to pack up and then we were shipped to a place called Seaford on the coast. We went in to training with a Royal Comando unit in the exercise of cliff scaling, beach landings etc. I believe we were a part of a first Canadian division organization and our roll was to be a task of scaling cliffs to knock out what I believe was some sort of radio or signal unit that the Germans had on the coast of France. Our commanding officer was a chap named Armstrong and I know we were a mixed bag of first Div. because in my tent we had several Van Doo's Royal 22nd and an officer from the PPCLI who I vaguely remember his name as Lieut. Doosenbury. Very early in August we were told to pack our bags and I was shipped back to my regiment. Shortly after arriving back I read of the terrible disaster at Dieppe. Later I understood that the powers to be did not want to commit anymore than one division and that was the second division. I have searched many records but have never been able to find any information on this unit. Sad to say, when I saw films on the Dieppe landings and what happened to the Royal Comandoes and Ranger battalions attempting to scale the cliffs I realize how lucky I am today to be here.

[Mark W. Tonner]

Hi Norm;

Now that you've got my curiosity aroused, I'll have a look, I seem to remember reading something about this, being that I like a good challenge, I'll see what I can dig up on the subject.

Cheers

[Mark W. Tonner]

Hi Norm;

Do you recall a Major McCool, R Regt C being involved in any way with this training or do you recall which Commando it was carried out with (ie: No. 3, No. 4 or... )? Was the Commando Army or Royal Marine?

Cheers

[Norm Cromie (RIP)]

Hi Mark:

Really appreciate your efforts in trying to help me fill in some of the gaps in my old memory. No, I cannot remember the officer we trained under but I believe it was the 12th Commando regiment under Lord Lovette . Thanks again for your interest. Always good to hear from you.

[Mark W. Tonner]

Originally posted by Norm Cromie
Hi Mark:

Really appreciate your efforts in trying to help me fill in some of the gaps in my old memory. No, I cannot remember the officer we trained under but I believe it was the 12th Commando regiment under Lord Lovette . Thanks again for your interest. Always good to hear from you.

Hi Norm;

Thanks for your reply. The reason I asked about Maj. McCool, was that in March 1942, he was the 'Corps Raiding Officer' and was detached for 'special duties' and sent off to Scotland to train for a small raid, who's target was identified as Dieppe. (Source; NAC Ottawa).

Ah, Lord Lovat, 17th Baron and Chief of the Clan Fraser, formerly an officer of the Scots Guards and later Officer Commanding No. 4 (Army) Commando, and even later, 1st Special Service Brigade (No. 1 Commando Brigade), with his own personal Piper in tow, Piper Bill Millin, Regina born....Glasgow raised. I'll have a look at No. 4 Commando and see what there is to see.

Cheers

Norm; does this look familiar.........Canadian troops practise cliff-scaling, 1942.

[Norm Cromie (RIP)]

Mark:
Thanks for the great photo. What I remember was that the cliffs were white chalk and at the top of the cliff where our headquarters was located in a little English cottage it had overlooking the ocean a small hand generated search light that used an arc light for its illumination source. The rest of the group were under canvas. We had demonstrations from the local home guard who showed us some of the wildest craziest anti invasion weapons you ever saw. Some of the rifle companies had to visit the local slaughter house and physically handle the inards of the butchered cattle. They were told this would toughen them up when they came under fire. Some of these war time commanders had some wierd ideas. Again Mark, appreciate your research efforts.
Norm

[Mark W. Tonner]

Originally posted by Norm Cromie
Some of these war time commanders had some wierd ideas

Trust me Norm, it's an ongoing thing, during my years of service I saw some very "Weird & Wonderful" ideas put forward by that 'class', whether it be training or operational, Yup!, some pretty weird & wonderful :, and it carries on........

Cheers

P.S. I'll keep digging and see what I find.

[Jon Skagfeld]

Originally posted by Mark W. Tonner
Hi Norm;

Thanks for your reply. The reason I asked about Maj. McCool, was that in March 1942, he was the 'Corps Raiding Officer' and was detached for 'special duties' and sent off to Scotland to train for a small raid, who's target was identified as Dieppe. (Source; NAC Ottawa).

Ah, Lord Lovat, 17th Baron and Chief of the Clan Fraser, formerly an officer of the Scots Guards and later Officer Commanding No. 4 (Army) Commando, and even later, 1st Special Service Brigade (No. 1 Commando Brigade), with his own personal Piper in tow, Piper Bill Millin, Regina born....Glasgow raised. I'll have a look at No. 4 Commando and see what there is to see.

Cheers

Norm; does this look familiar.........Canadian troops practise cliff-scaling, 1942.

Mark: wasn't the piper's name "Mullen" or "McMullen"?

Also...Brian McCool wound up with the Royal Regiment of Canada as, I think, Band Officer prior to Gino Falcone taking over.

McCool died c.1983.

[Geoff Winnington-Ball (RIP)]

Originally posted by Jon Skagfeld
Mark: wasn't the piper's name "Mullen" or "McMullen"?

Also...Brian McCool wound up with the Royal Regiment of Canada as, I think, Band Officer prior to Gino Falcone taking over.

McCool died c.1983.

Jon, the piper WAS 'Bill Millin', and our own Nigel Watson here has the privilege of knowing him personally. Somewhere I have a pic of the two of them together. I'll try to dig it up. Piper Millin recently donated his original pipes to the Edinburgh Museum, if I recall correctly.

[Hanno Spoelstra]

Originally posted by Geoff Winnington-Ball
Jon, the piper WAS 'Bill Millin', and our own Nigel Watson here has the privilege of knowing him personally.

Here's the picture:

Hi Norm, you are right about trying to get information on Commando Training facilities in the Seaford area of East Sussex. There are a number of oblique references to it on some sites. The three Commando units that went to Dieppe were 3 and 4 Commando (Army) and "A" Commando (RM). Most of the training appears to have taken place in Scotland at among other places Inverarry (I'm sure you have pleasant memories of that place). The Commando units along with some Canadian Soldiers of the 2nd Division arrived in the Seaford area prior to going to Dieppe.
4 Commando under Lord Lovat appears to have been the only one to have attained it's objective, the destruction of a German coastal battery. "A" Commando was descimated and was reconstituted as 40 Commando (RM) shortly after it's return.
Prior to Dieppe 50 members of the Carelton and York Regiment accompanied 4 Commando on a raid to destroy a German Search Light unit in France that turned in to a bit of a debacle when the Germans turned the Search Lights on them. So you may be luckier than you think.
"Daddy" Armstrong's son Joe is supposed to be writing his father's biography and has said that he has some interesting things to tell about his father's exploits during the war. Maybe he will touch on this episode.
I could not find any reference that the Royal Marines ran a Commando Training Centre at Seaford they state that their Commando Training Centre has always been at Lympstone in Devon and is still there.

For a nice picture of Seaford today go to this site;

http://www.seaford.co.uk/

[Mark W. Tonner]

Originally posted by Art Johnson
Prior to Dieppe 50 members of the Carelton and York Regiment accompanied 4 Commando on a raid to destroy a German Search Light unit in France that turned in to a bit of a debacle when the Germans turned the Search Lights on them. So you may be luckier than you think.

Hi Norm/Art;

Reference: "Prior to Dieppe 50 members of the Carelton and York Regiment accompanied 4 Commando on a raid" - Part # 1:

Operation "ABERCROMBIE", a "small reconnaissance raid", which took place on the coast of Occupied France south of Boulogne on 22 Apr 42. It was the first such operation in which Canadian troops actually crossed the Channel.

Operation "ABERCROMBIE" was a minor operation, conceived with the objects of reconnoitring a stretch of the French coast, capturing a few prisoners, and doing such damage as circumstances permitted.

Apparently, the reason why it was '50' members of the Carleton and York Regiment who were picked for this operation was, according to the Officer Commanding them, (Lt. J.P. Ensor) this: "that when the operation was offered to 1 Cdn Div, it was allotted to a unit of 3 Cdn Inf Bde because whereas 1 Cdn Inf Bde had reached France in June 1940 and units of 2 Cdn Inf Bde participated in the expedition to Spitsbergen, 3 Cdn Inf Bde had so far had no such opportunity." A total of eight officers (including a medical officer), one warrant officer and 60 other ranks were selected from the Carleton and York Regiment.

On 8 Apr 42 Lt Ensor with this detachment met Major Lovat with a detachment of No. 4 Commando at Portsmouth Station. Thence the combined force moved by M.T. to HYTHE, on the west shore of Southampton Water, whence they were embarked upon H.M.S. PRINCE ALBERT, on which they lived while training during the next ten days.

The training, which was conducted in the SOLENT, is described by Lt. Ensor, "The practice landings were carried out from 2 A.L.C.'s, one which carried the Bridgehead party, and the other which carried two fighting patrols. We had also, one S.L.C. which supported our landings." (Note: S.L.C. - properly L.S.C. - 'Light Support Craft'.)".

The Bridgehead party consisted of 25 all ranks, armed with six Bren guns, five sub-machine guns, nine rifles, and fourteen .38 pistols, Officers carried rifles in addition to pistols. The two fighting patrols each consisted of one officer, one sergeant, and ten other ranks, armament comprising one Bren gun, give Tommy guns, five rifles (riflemen being equipped as bombers) and two pistols. A very careful drill was carried out for crossing barbed wire obstacles and taking up a Bridgehead position. After crossing the wire, the men were trained to go to their respective places in the Bridgehead without any word of command. These places were never changed, and the men got to know who was on their left and right without asking.

The objective of the operation was a section of the coast of France lying immediately south of Boulogne-sur-Mer, and including the village of Hardelot, which lies roughly seven miles south of the entrance to Boulogne harbour. The coast at this point runs almost exactly north and south, and the shore on either side of the village is comparatively low and accessible, though during the actual operation the sand dunes were found to be a fairly formidable obstacle.

The intention of the raid was to effect a landing on the French Coast under cover of darkness, reconnoitre Military Defences and beaches North and South of Hardelot, attack and destroy a Searchlight Post and return with prisoners and all available information. The proposed method was to land "B" and "C" Troops of No. 4 Commando on 'Red Beach' in the area north of Hardelot, from four A.L.Cs. Simultaneously the detachment of the Carleton and York Regiment would land from A.L.C.s on 'White Beach' in the area south of Hardelot.

From Lord Lovat's Operation Order No. 1: "The Canadian Force will land at the discretion of Lieut. Ensor in area south of Hardelot and after establishing a Beach Head will send out Fighting Patrols to investigate local defences and capture prisoners. It is suggested that the secondary road into sand dunes from Neufchatel offers the possibility for an ambush. There are two large warehouse buildings in the Southern outskirts of the village one of which appears in Air Photographs to be of strategic importance to the enemy defences. Both Warehouses will be investigated and if they contain enemy stores or personnel they will be set on fire. O.C. White Beach will leave attack on Hardelot village until Zero + 60 minutes; Approaches and the general lay-out will be carefully investigated during this period and suitable plans made for ambushing enemy reinforcements brought up for fire fighting".

The Channel Crossing - The Senior Naval Officer of the escort for the raiding force was Lt-Cmdr. T.N. Cartwright, R.N.V.R., Senior Officer 14th M.G.B. Flotilla. The Senior Naval Officer with the South Beach (Canadian) party, until the day of the operation, had been Lt. Quick, R.N.V.R.; but on the morning of the 21 Apr this officer fell ill and was replaced by the next senior, the officer commanding L.S.C.2, Lt. G.B. Eyre, T.N.V.R. This last- minute substitution may have had an adverse influence upon the course of the operation. Lt. Quick's place in his own boat, A.L.C.3,was taken by Sub-Lt. Jeffrey, R.N.V.R. For the Channel crossing, the military force was embarked in motor gunboats which towed the A.L.C.s. Lt.-Cmdr. Cartwright states that the force cleared the entrance to Dover harbour at 1956hrs on 21 Apr. The passage across the Channel was uneventful and at 0100 hours the flotilla was two and a half miles off Hardelot. Here the troops were transferred without difficulty from the M.G.B.s to the A.L.C.s. The Flotilla sub-divided and proceed as requisite for a landing which was scheduled for 0130hrs. Lt-Cmdr. Cartwright states, "At 0112 South Beach landing party had dis-embarked and moved off from M.G.B. 316 and at 0114 the North Beach party had done similarly"

Lord Lovat's Party - this party disembarked without opposition at 0140hrs, crossed wire defences on the forward slope of the dunes with some little difficulty, and established a Bridgehead with perimeter defence. Apparently, however, the party had been put ashore some considerable distance to the north of the intended point of landing, and in the vicinity of an unnamed stream which flows into the Channel. While the perimeter defence was being taken up, firing opened from the direction of Hardfelot, much tracer being visible, and Lord Lovat, surmising that the Canadian party might have been opposed in landing, broke wireless silence and through his own L.S.C. made an enquiry to the L.S.C. with the Canadians. An immediate reply was received to the effect that the Canadian party had not yet landed, "and that the tracer was coming from the M.G.Bs in naval action with enemy forces"

Two fighting patrols were sent out to right and left, and a third patrol was directed against the searchlight post about a half a mile inland. This patrol is stated by Lord Lovat to have been engaged from its left flank throughout its advance. It reached the wire defences about the searchlight post, and had apparently cut is way through them, when the recall rocket was fired from the Bridgehead and the party was obliged to return without completing its task. It evidently suffered no casualties by enemy action. Although there was considerable firing, there was not close contact with the enemy. It is believed that there had been enemy parties near the point of landing, but that they decamped without seeking contact with the Commando detachments. One small enemy patrol was encountered on or near the beach during the operation, but it escaped owing to a premature challenge by a sentry. It appears that the only casualty suffered by Lord Lovat's party was one man shot through both ankles. This injury resulted from his failure to answer a challenge promptly enough, and was inflicted by British bullets.

Lord Lovat's states that re-embarkation of his party was completed at Zero + 120 minutes. As Zero was the time at which the first man got ashore, this would be about 0340hrs. His flotilla of three A.L.C.s and one L.S.C. reached Dungeness about 0830hrs, was subsequently "picked up by the shadowing force which had cruised all night in mid Channel" and moved back to Dover. Only when his party landed in England did Lord Lovat learn that the Canadian party had never got ashore.

Part # 2 follows.

[Mark W. Tonner]

Hi Norm/Art;

Reference: "Prior to Dieppe 50 members of the Carelton and York Regiment accompanied 4 Commando on a raid" - Part # 2:


The Canadian Party - was divided between two A.L.C.s., and was accompanied by an L.S.C. (L.S.C.2) in which was the Senior Naval Officer with Lt. Eyre's party accompanied by a military officer(Lt. L.B. Groom, CYR) whose function was to direct the first of the L.S.C. on to proper targets. An "R-boat" (R.154) was also attached to this group but was assigned to sounding duties and did not keep close company. In A.L.C 3 was Lt. Ensor with the Bridgehead party, including Lt. E.H. Snell, its commander; in A.L.C. 5 were the two patrols, Lt. W.Y. Smith being the senior military officer.

In the beginning considerable time was lost in assembling the little flotilla, as L.S.C. 2 had been towed by a different M.G.B. and could not immediately locate the other craft. Lt. Ensor reported, considered that in all "about 15 minutes" may have been wasted in this manner. Finally all the craft of the party were assembled and set out for the shore. The reports of the Canadian officers, however, indicate that the naval officers in charge of the vessels had difficulty in setting and keeping a course. Lt. GROOM's personal report, runs in part as follows: "The equipment of the S.L.C. is very poor. The compass on it always pointed South East regardless of the course and consequently the officer in charge was forced to use an army compass ... On the second attempt, when we left the M.G.B., we were given a bearing South 68 degrees East. We lost some time at the start because the officer could not see the numbers on the ring of the compass to set it. This I did for him and we set out. I started checking with my compass from the stern of the boat and found that we were generally quite a few degrees out. The magnetic attraction of these boats makes a compass act very peculiar".

Lt. Groom's report continues: "Soon after leaving the M.G.B., we heard gun-fire and very shortly after our stern seemed to be alight with tracers. At this point, the officer stopped the boat and tried to get the A.L.C. carrying the Bridgehead to pull along side and decide on a place to land. All the boats started going in a circle and it was then that we lost our other A.L.C.".

The A.L.C. which became separated from the other craft was that carrying Lt. Ensor and the Bridgehead party. A.L.C.5 and the L.S.C. succeeded in maintaining contact. On discovering that they were separated from the force commander, the two craft remaining in company began to search for his A.L.C. This search was unsuccessful. The party, in fact, was finally reunited only on returning to Dover.

Lt. Ensor's craft similarly carried on a search for the other two vessels. Its experience is described in Lt. Snell's report as follows: "We cruised about for some time searching for them but failed to locate them. Our motors were shut off while considering whether or not to make an independent landing. During this time, a rocket, which was to have been the signal to return to port, was fired from the Commando beach. Our craft then returned to port". Had both parties decided to go ashore independently, it would probably have resulted one party shooting up the other.

The experience of the two craft which remained together is graphically described in the report of Lt. W.Y. Smith: "With the flotilla complete, there seemed to be some doubt in the minds of the Naval personnel as to just where the beach lay, and at 0215hrs, I was under the impression that we were moving about in an ever widening circle, going in no general direction. At 0225hrs, there suddenly opened up a terrific amount of M.G. fire along with what seemed to be artillery fire from a direction about one mile to our South. I saw a rocket go up which looked to me to be the re-call rocket. On endeavouring to locate our force commander, Lt Ensor, I found that his craft was no longer with us. We then proceeded to search for A.L.C. 3. During this period, I saw a second rocket go up which I definitely identified as the re-call rocket. The Flotilla leader also agreed that it was the proper rocket. We decided that we would wait a while longer, hoping that the A.L.C. would turn up. During this time, the Germans were sending up a great many flares which illuminated the beaches, and were machine-gunning at random in our general direction. Searchlights were also quite active on the beach. By the light of the flares, I was able to discern that the portion of the coast which we were opposite, consisted of quite high chalk cliffs, and I estimated that we were about four miles north of our proper objective. At one period, we were drifting close to the beach, and fouled one propeller on the bottom. This left us with one engine with which to return to England. The Naval Officer in charge of my A.L.C. said that he did not like to go ashore with one propeller. At approximately 0350hrs, deciding that as one-half hour had elapsed since the rocket had gone up and as we found by wireless that the Commandos had also left the beach, we decided that the other A.L.C. would not turn up and we set course for England. Returning, we were trailed for a short period by a German "E" boat, but he was unable to locate us in the mist and darkness. At one period, we were in the focus of two German Searchlights but for some reasons, the Germans did not fire on us".

It is clear that, during the period when the Canadian party was offshore, there was fairly heavy enemy machine-gun fire, and some though not all of those present believed that German field artillery was also in action. Although Major Lovat's report makes no reference to the firing of the rocket which was the signal of recall the statement by his Adjutant, Lt. A.D.C. Smith leaves no doubt that it was actually fired as reported by the Canadian officers. The craft which had remained together clearly did not leave the coast until the fact that the Commando detachment had withdrawn was confirmed by wireless. "We hung around the coast quite close to shore and did not start for home until we heard over the 18 set that the Commandos were homeward bound" (Lt. Groom's report).

On the basis of Lieut. Snell's report it seems likely that the single A.L.C. withdrew from the area somewhat before the two craft still in company. It will be noted, on the basis of Lt. W.Y. Smith's report, that there is little doubt that the Canadian craft were brought to a position some miles north of the intended point of landing. The high ground referred to by Lt. Smith is presumably that in the area Nocquet-Equihenecault. The fact that Lt. Ensor did not see this high ground suggests that his A.L.C. was actually separated from the other craft by a very considerable distance during the period when the two portions of the party were mutually search for each other.

The German fire was evidently blind, and there were no Canadian casualties. Officers of both Canadian parties mention having seen enemy "E" boats but it seems probable that none of these vessels sighted the Canadian craft, and that no enemy fire was actually aimed at the latter.

The Reurn to Port - the naval force which had escorted the expedition across the Channel, and which had anchored at the dispersal point, came into contact with German light craft of 0200hrs, and, cutting anchor lines, engaged them(report of Lt-Cmdr. Cartwright). During the action which followed, our forces inflicted heavy damage on German vessels, probably sinking one, and themselves lost three men killed. The action carried the British M.G.B.s. out of the Hardelot area and there was no further contact between these M.G.B.s. and Lord Lovat's or Lt. Ensor's forces. The three craft carrying the Canadian party drew off from the French coast under their own power, and after covering a considerable distance encountered other British naval vessels off Dungeness in the early morning. Lt. Ensor's own A.L.C., after being towed for a time by an M.G.B., entered Dover harbour under its own power about 1000hrs on 22 Apr. The other two craft, having similarly encountered British motor gunboats were towed into Dover not long afterwards. Lt. Eyre's report states that L.S.C.2 reached Dover at 1115hrs. During the final period of the operation, after daylight, the R.A.F. provided fighter cover over the Straits, and there were no attacks by enemy aircraft.

*************************************************
Interview with Captain J.P. Ensor, Carleton and York Regiment

Canadian Military Headquarters 22 Jul 42

Subject: Operation "ABERCROMBIE", 22 Apr 42, and accompanying circumstances

Captain ENSOR called on the writer by request, with a view to clearing up certain points concerning "ABERCROMBIE" not fully dealt with in the documents.

Captain Ensor explained that on Friday, 3 Apr 42 (date from memory, assisted by consulting calendar) he met Major Lord LOVAT at the War Office, LONDON, and was told that he was going "on a raid" (locality not mentioned). The number of men and the type of equipment required was specified.

Captain Ensor believes that when this operation was offered to 1 Cdn Div, a unit of 3 Cdn Inf Bde was selected for it because 1 Cdn Inf Bde had been to France in June 1940, and troops of 2 Cdn Inf Bde had participated in the expedition to SPITZBERGEN.

On Tuesday, 7 Apr 42, Captain Ensor received his final instructions from Lord Lovat by telephone. In accordance with these, he and his detachment met Lord Lovat and his Commando party at PORTSMOUTH Station the following day, 8 Apr 42. These the combined force moved by M.T. to HYTHE, on the west shore of SOUTHAMPTON WATER, whence they were embarked upon H.M.S. "Prince Albert", on which they lived during the training period that followed.

This training was as realistic as it could be made, landings being carried out precisely as they would be in face of the enemy. Landings were made in the vicinities of NEEDS OAR POINT, STONE POINT and CALSHOT CASTLE on the NEW FOREST side of the SOLENT, and also on the ISLE OF WIGHT.

On Saturday, 18 Apr 42, the force moved to DOVER by M.T., arriving about midnight. Here they were quartered in DROP REDOUBT, an old (and dirty) moated work on the WESTERN HEIGHTS. The whole force, including Captain (then Lieutenant) Ensor himself, was locked up here and not permitted to go out. There was, however, one possible loophole in the system of security, as there was an Observer Corps post on the roof of the Redoubt, and its personnel were allowed to come and go. It was reported that people in DOVER were heard talking about Canadian having arrived to take part in a raid; and Captain Ensor believes that this was the only possible source of the information.

On Sunday, 19 Apr, there was a conference with the Naval authorities (the R.A.F. also being represented) at Naval Headquarters, DOVER, at which the details of the operation were discussed for the benefit of all concerned.

Captain Ensor mentioned that a very fine large-scale model of the area to be raided had been prepared, and that in general very complete intelligence material- including both air photographs and photographs of the village taken before the war - was provided. Both Lord Lovat and Captain Ensor attended this conference.

Before embarking for the operation, the CARLETON AND YORK detachment removed from their battle-dress blouses not only their 1 Cdn Div patches and their regimental flashes, but also their "CANADA" badges - which, Captain Ensor said, his men were very unwilling to "take down".

Captain Ensor said that he had turned in one copy of his own Operation Order for this unit's War Diary. This, however, was not placed upon the War Diary. He will try to trace it. In the mean-time, he summarized it briefly to the following effect:

a. While he himself remained in the bridgehead near the beach with a small reserve, Lieut. CROOK was to take a patrol out to the RIGHT (i.e. SOUTH) with a view to establishing a "flank block" and ambushing any enemy party approaching the shore by the secondary road from NEUFCHATEL. At Zero plus 60' he would attack and clear a wired enemy position which had been located near the shore on this flank; and

b. Simultaneously Lieut. SMITH with the other patrol would operate on the other flank. He would move inland to a small wood (not shown on map) near HARDELOT, reconnoitring the dunes (for passage by A.F.Vs., etc) en route. He would after reconnaissance plan on attack on a large warehouse on the outskirts of the village near the shore, air photographs showed a pillbox on the roof of this building. He was also to investigate another warehouse near the station. This attack was to be made at Zero plus 60'. His party was equipped with 12 incendiary bombs and 100 incendiary bullets for firing the buildings. After delivering his attack, he was to ambush any enemy parties arriving to fight the fires, and to retire to the bridgehead by way of the shore, shooting up any opposition encountered.

Captain Ensor confirms that the actual strength of the CARLETON AND YORK detachment engaged in the operation was 50 all ranks. This included eight officers (Lieuts. ENSOR, FARTHING (with bridgehead), SNELL (commanding bridgehead), SMITH (No. 1 Patrol), CROOK (No. 2 Patrol), THORNTO(Beachmaster), and GROOM (in L.S.C. with Navy, not to land), and Capt Ian S. MacLEAN, R.C.A.M.C. (Medical Officer). The remainder of his party (which was detailed in nominal roll in unit War Diary amounted to seven officers - M.O. not shown - one W.O. 1, and 60 other ranks) was left behind in DROP REDOUBT. Three of the men detailed to remain behind fell in with the raiding party with full equipment, but were detected and sent back; there was simply no room for more than the prescribed number.

As described in documents, the first attempt at carrying out the operation (night 19/20 Apr) was abandoned after an A.L.C. sank in tow. The operation itself was carried out on the night of 21/22 Apr, the sea being calm but visibility reduced by mist. The naval officer who had worked with Captain Ensor during training was not present for the operation and those naval officers who were present with the Canadian party were junior and inexperienced officers of the R.N.V.R. To this, and to the inefficiency of the compasses with which the light craft were equipped, Captain Ensor attributed the blame for the craft carrying the Canadian party being brought to the wrong part of the coast and becoming separated. In consequence of these misfortunes, none of the Canadians got ashore.

Captain Ensor stated that the raiding party was accompanied by, in all, four motor gunboats. Of these only one was with his own party. The transfer into A.L.C.s took place possibly 2-1/2 miles from the French coast, possibly a little less.

The naval forces suffered some casualties in personnel during their action with enemy craft. The only military casualty was a Commando soldier wounded as the result of no answering a British challenge.

Captain Gordon WEBB, commanding the Commando patrol charged with the duty of destroying the searchlight post, told Captain Ensor that his party had cut through the wire surrounding this post at the time when the recall rocket was fired. He also said that as a result of the action of the sand on automatic weapons, at this time the only weapon in his patrol able to fire was an automatic pistol.

On the return voyage to England, Captain Ensor said, no further contact was made with the M.G.B.s. which had taken party across the Channel, but it was picked up by British vessels of a similar but somewhat larger type on patrol in the Straits. Captain Ensor's own craft, after being towed for a short time, was cast off and entered DOVER harbour about 1000 hrs on 22 Apr under its own power. The other two Canadian craft were towed in together
between 1000 and 1030 hrs.

Captain Ensor stated that relations between his detachment and the men of the Commando detachment were excellent, and he go on very well with Lord Lovat, who, he thinks, well deserved the M.C. which he has since received. Relations with the Naval personnel were also satisfactory during training but the operation itself, in the circumstances, left the Canadians feeling that the Navy were responsible for their disappointment.

Captain Ensor made the remark that his men would welcome the opportunity to participate in an "all-Canadian" operation, involving Canadian Naval as well as military forces.

He spoke with satisfaction of the morale of his men during the operation, mentioning in particular that when firing began he instructed his Bren gunners to mount their guns on the gunwale of the A.L.C. and that there upon every man in the craft immediately rose up, forsaking cover, in the hope of exchanging shots with the enemy. An enemy E-boat did come close enough to be fired upon, but Captain Ensor did not allow his men to open fire for fear of disclosing their position. He believes their craft was not seen.

Captain Ensor himself did not hear or see artillery firing from the shore during the operation, though some witnesses believe that enemy field guns were in action.

C.P.S.
(C.P. Stacey) Major
Historical Officer

22 Jul 42

Part # 3 to follow.

[Mark W. Tonner]

Hi Norm/Art;

Reference: "Prior to Dieppe 50 members of the Carelton and York Regiment accompanied 4 Commando on a raid" - Part # 3:

Copy of memorandum of interview of Lieut. Ensor with Mr. Saunders, Combined Operations Recorder.

Operation "ABERCROMBIE"

Personal Account of Lieutenant J.P. Ensor - Carleton & York Regt.

8 Officers and 44 other ranks took part in the expedition. We started out on Tuesday night, 24th April, all of us being on board one M.G.B. with two A.L.C.'s in tow. We were to land on the South or White beach. I was in command of the party. There was no incident of any kind until we got to point X. We were all in very high spirits.

We were transhipped from the M.G.B. to the A.L.C. We were then about 2 miles off shore. Another M.G.B. was towing an S.L.C. and we lost a lot of time trying to find it. We had to use a mega-phone. In all I suppose we wasted about 15 minutes. This was partly due to bad visibility because the S.L.C. was being towed behind another M.G.B. and this was hard to find in the darkness. On reaching Point X, it had stopped its engines and we therefore had drifted. Those in the S.L.C. were responsible for the direction and navigation of the A.L.C.s. On board the S.L.C. was a Naval Officer, a Military Officer whose duty it was to advise us if fire support should be given, and a number of signallers.

When the party moved towards shore, one A.L.C. was to Port to other to Starboard. I was in the Port A.L.C. with Headquarters and the beach head party. The Starboard A.L.C. contained my two patrols. My intention was to land on White beach, make a reconnaissance of the defences, capture some prisoners and destroy a warehouse S.W. of HARDELOT. We had noticed from the photographs that a pill-box was on the roof and we therefore know that the enemy was in occupation of the warehouse.

When the three Assault craft, the two A.L.C.s and the S.L.C., got under way, the S.L.C. was moving on a bearing of I think S69E. As far as I could make out they were using a prismatic oil compass. So were we. We couldn't see the figures on the dial and the Military Officer started checking them and found we a few degrees out. I do not think that the boat compass on the A.L.C.s were working properly. Not long after getting under way fire was opened about 0210 hrs. I noticed tracers coming from the sea behind us a mile or so away. At that moment my A.L.C. became separated from the other A.L.C. and from the S.L.C. The boats then began to travel in a circle. Fire opened from the shore I should judge a single machine gun and then three searchlights were turned on. They were not strong and I don't think they picked us up although their beams struck us.

One A.L.C. to Port and one to Starboard and the S.L.C. ahead. I ordered the Bren gunners to mount their guns on the gunwales. There were two mounting in the bow. By then we were alone. All the men stood up although unprotected because they were eager to have a crack at the huns.

After we had been going for a short time an "E" boat I think it was passed close to our stern about 150 yards away. It was firing tracer but not at us. The Naval Officer with me, Sub. Lt. Jeffrey I think his name was, (The Sub. Lt. on board the other A.L.C. was named Sub. Lt. Sharp) had not practiced the operation with me when we had been training for it. In training I had been working with Lt. Quick.

I begun a consultation with Sub. Lt. Jeffrey. By now as I have said we were alone and though I had my beach head party with me I had lost touch with the A.L.C. containing my two patrols. We agreed that we must first find the other A.L.C. and them a landing. By that time I am sure we were not going towards the right beach. We were by then 3/400 yds. from the shore. We tried to find the other A.L.C. and cruised about but presently we began to get worried about the amount of petrol we had on board. We had, of course, to keep enough to take us back to England. Then we saw a rocket fired from on shore, the lights being Green over Red. It was right ahead of us and it was the signal that the operation was washed out. Immediately on seeing the rocket we turned about and set craft for England sailing on a bearing of 280o. Once again we had trouble with the prismatic oil compass. The Naval Officer took a bearing but could not see the figures on the dials very clearly. I used my own compass. We sent straight for England because we didn't want to use any more petrol looking for the M.G.B.s. I kept checking the bearing from time to time. At daylight we mounted the Bren guns as a protection against aircraft. Nothing was seen however and we were eventually picked up about 7 miles off Dungeness at approximately 0645 hrs.

I consider the failure to effect a landing was due to faulty equipment. When we got near the coast of France we were in face off the North beach instead of off the South. Men from the other A.L.C. and S.L.C. which go separated from us saw cliffs in the light of the searchlights and Verey lights. They evidently thought they were north of the unnamed river marked on the map. This was true but they were outside the boundary set for the operation.

I should like to emphasis that the spirit of the men was very high and that they are all longing for another chance.

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Copy of memorandum of interview of Lieut. Smith with Mr. Saunders, Combined Operations Recorder.

Operation "ABERCROMBIE"

Lt. A.D.C. Smith, Adjutant to Major Lord Lovat, commanding Operation.

Lieutenant A.D.C. Smith:

We left Troon on 7th April, and reached Portsmouth at 12:00 noon, the party consisting of 100 men from he Commandos, and a small Canadian force from the Carleton and York Regiments.

The Commandos carried out a number of training exercises for the next few days, these being a rehearsal for the operation. They were conducted mostly from H.M.S. "Prince Albert". Everyone remained on board this vessel until about 18 hours in the evening, and during 10 days of rehearsal only 2 full nights' sleep were obtained.

The scheme was for the assault landing craft to act as flotilla, being towed until over the beaches by M.L.s. The first exercise was to make a landing on the Beaulieu River Bank. It was not very successful, for the M.T.B. towing A.L.C. ran aground.

The next exercise, on the following night, was more satisfactory, and a landing was about to be effected, and indeed had been partially carried out, on the beach opposite NETLEY HOSPITAL, when it was discovered that this part of the beach was kept very secret, and that the Commandos had had no business to practice on it. We were accordingly withdrawn in a hurry.

The next day we landed in the daylight at Cowes and carried out a series of exercises, the object being to cut still further the time it took to transfer from M.T.B. or M.G.B. to A.L.C. The practices were designed to teach how to establish a beach head perimeter, and thus to have a base from which to send out patrols.

A day or two later another landing was attempted at the Mouth of the Beaulieu. On this occasion the troops got ashore, but discovered that Beaulieu Spit was a bog, into which they sank up to their thighs. Much bad language was used.

In all these practices, not all of which were by any means successful, the object was to carry out as far as possible the movements which would be required during the operation.

Another exercise of the same kind was brought to naught by one of the M.G.B.s running aground.

During these days of practice it was usual to finish at about 3 a.m., and then to go to bed, breakfast being about 9:00. By the time these exercises had been in progress for about a week the Commandos were getting somewhat "browned off" because they did not know why they were being kept there or what they were supposed to do, since no inkling of the proposed operation had yet reached them.

On the 18th April the Commandos left Southampton in a transport ship, reaching Dover that night at about 2300 hours. They were housed in Drop Redout - a filthy place - for it did not appear to have been cleaned out for a long while. It was, however, ideal for the purpose of concealing the Commandos, for no one could get in or out except across the moat, and the only persons to do so were those supplied with special passes. In this redout the Commandos waited for orders. It was for the Vice-Admiral at Dover to decide just when the operation was to take place. The Commando Troops occupied their time priming grenades and collecting escaping gear. Everyone was in cracking good form.

At 1900 hrs the Commandos were taken in lorries to the submarine base at Dover Harbour, and embarked in some M.G.Bs. These numbered 4. There were 6 Assault Landing Craft and 2 S.L.C. The leader of the destroyer flotilla towed 2 D.L.Cs, one commanded by Lt. Cdr. M.G.B. The embarkation was completed about 1600 hrs BST, the troops being put on board 2 S.L.Cs. (Support Landing Craft) and 6 A.L.Cs (Assault Landing Craft). One of the two last A.L.Cs had a particularly brave leader, Mr. Mackinnon, R.N.V.R, who went into the battle in the company of Lord Lovat. There were 50 men in each M.G.B., and they reached the outer defences about 1930 hrs.

Before leaving Dover a regular Regatta took place, and there was no attempt for security. They embarked in the far part of Dover harbour, in full view of the town, and then frolicked about for hours.

About 2030 hrs the flotilla sailed, in broad daylight. The sea was really choppy, and the A.L.C. with Lt. Smith on board shipped a certain amount of water. The flotilla headed towards Dungeness, but at 2300 hours, when it was dark, the commanders noticed that the ships were constantly stopping because one A.L.C. frequently buried her whole nose in the water. Eventually one of the A.L.Cs went right under - perhaps because it got into the wash of the A.L.C. being towed in front of it. As Lt. Smith expressed it "It took a bit at a wave, and then went down and became full of water." Very soon the run ways were level with the sea. When this happened a cry went in "We are sinking". This A.L.C. was directly behind the M.G.B. towing it. The second A.L.C., astern of the first, and attached to it by a tow, at once slipped its tow and came up alongside the sinking A.L.C. By this time 4 naval ratings and 2 soldiers had climbed onto the engine house in the stern. In the confusion 2 naval ratings jumped overboard and were not seen again. The whole convoy stopped and there was a good deal of shouting. Lights had to be turned on. At this time the convoy was about 15 miles from the French coast. The A.L.C. remained afloat for about an hour. The convoy circled during this time, trying to find the 2 men, who had gone overboard, but without success. The decision was them made to return to port, and the flotilla made Dover again about 0300 hrs. Everyone was feeling very "browned off" and did not welcome Drop Redout, to which they repaired.

On Monday morning, 20th April, the Commando troops were informed that the decision whether or not the operation would take place that night, would be made know at 1500 hours. When that time came the operation was cancelled, but the period of the attack was extended by one day. Eventually, on Tuesday 21st, after a conference at Dover Castle, it was decided to carry on whatever the weather. Everyone was very keen, and the same procedure as on the first occasion was followed, without the ostentatious, regatta-like manoeuvres in the outer harbour. It was a perfect night, calm, but dark, for the moon was only a day or two old. There was a very slight mist over the water. The Commando was due to land on the French coast at 0130 hrs. This time everything at first went without a hitch. At 0115 hrs the A.L.Cs came alongside the M.G.Bs and the troops embarked on board them. Since, however, one A.L.C. had been sunk during the first attempt, the troops were very crowded.

The operation was a reconnaissance, the object being to find to the possibilities of landing on this particular stretch of coast. There was very little accurate information available. The plan was for the Commando troops to land on Red beach, to the North, while the Canadian troops landed on White beach to the South.

The A.L.Cs proceeded towards the shore running aboard the leading boat. Lt Smith was with Major Lord Lovat in the support landing craft. In point of fact direction was lost almost at once and the Commando troops landed about a mile too far North of Red Beach - some 300 yards from an unnamed stream. As we neared the land we could see high ground, and we knew, there-fore, that we were too far North and veered South, eventually landing, as I have said, about a mile from the position aimed at. The Canadians, who were supposed to go to White Beach tried to land still further North, and were therefore several miles from where they should have been. These mistakes were due either to a defect in the compasses, or to miscalculations. The Canadians were fired on, and did not eventually land. The Commandos landed at 0152 hrs, slightly late on schedule. The landing was carried out very quietly. The men were wearing gym shoes with very little equipment to hamper them. A great many were carrying Tommy guns, and carried 8 magazines with them. The first man of the S.L.C. to land was Major Lord Lovat, who tested the depth of the water.

He was out of his depth, and therefore hung on to the edge of the landing craft till he could walk. He then told the rest in a normal voice to get out. By this time the other troops had disembarked. We all got very wet. Major Lord Lovat was a very tall man and could walk in places where it was still out of the depth of the others. The signallers carried their wireless sets on their heads like African porters. Some of us when we got out found ourselves waist deep, and then thigh deep, and then shoulder deep, for the bottom of the sea was undulating. There was no sign of the enemy. We advanced in a very dignified way to the bottom of the dunes, crossing a fore shore about 200 yards wide.

The Commandos had been divided into 4 groups. 3 of them Were to form a beach head, with H.Q. in the middle, and 4 group was to take a patrol towards the high ground. Half an hour after landing some of 3 group were to send out a patrol to the South, and some of 1 group to the North. On landing, however, things were wrong. 4 group went out on its patrol intact, but the other 3 groups, instead of forming one beach head formed 3 all in line. This was probably due to the fact that the groups had been somewhat mixed up in embarkation, due to the loss of one of the A.L.Cs. The mistake, I consider, was almost unavoidable, for it was impossible to reform in the darkness, and it was therefore particularly difficult for the leader of Group 2 to collect his men, so as to form part of one beach head. H.Q. found themselves behind 1 group - it was in fact group number 1 and was on the extreme south of the party.

During all the landing and forming up on the beach no shots were fired. A few Verey lights went up and the Boche seemed suspicious. Then, however, fire broke out behind us to the South West, out to sea. We saw tracer bullets and Verey lights. They seemed quite close, and we got the impression that the Germans had discovered the Canadians and were opening fire upon them as they attempted to land on White Beach. In actual fact that was happening as that the Navy had encountered the German Flak ship. There were a few casualties, I understand, in one of the M.G.Bs. This affair out to sea led to a certain amount of confusion.

The plan was:

a. If the landing were unopposed them troops were to stay on shore for a maximum period of 2 hours.

b. If the landing were opposed, but not heavily, then troops were to spend 30 minutes ashore.

c. If the landing were heavily opposed then no attempt at landing was to be made.

It was understood that in the absence of orders to the contrary A. was to be put into operation. The signal to put B. into operation was to be the firing of a special rocket showing a red light over green. These signals could be sent up either from Red beach or White beach, and it was understood that booth beaches were to follow the same plan, whatever was happening on their own immediate fronts. We on Red beach though the naval battle was a signal to put plan B into operation, and were therefore in a difficulty because our patrol, consisting of number 4 group, was already out, and had been absent some 20 minutes. It consisted of about 25 men. It, therefore appears to me that at one time half the force though plan A. to be in operation, the other half plan B. We definitely adopted plan B, and eventually got through on the wireless, but not direct to the Canadians. We were told that the battle was a naval one, that the Canadians were not involved. There was therefore no reason to adopt plan B.

The naval battle died down in about 10 minutes, and we were left wondering whether the ships which had brought us there, and which were to take up off, had been sunk. At that moment a small German patrol of about 7 men came along the fore-shore from the direction of Hardelot. When they were about 30 yards away we both saw and heard them. Either they challenged us or we them, I am not sure which, I heard some one say "Let'em have it", and fire as opened, lasting for about 3 minutes. The Huns all flocked to the ground in a bunch. I though we made a mistake in remaining in the fore-shore and not going right up into the dunes. The Huns then ran, and I do not think any of them were hit. They never came back, and as far as I know there were no casualties on either side.

All this happened about half an hour after landing - i.e. about 0220 hrs. There was then a complete lull, and there was no taking except for the issue of necessary orders. Presently a searchlight pointed from the high ground to our left. It shone on one of our A.L.C.s but no fire was opened by the enemy. Our A.L.C. fired at it with a Bren gun.

We then received a wireless message from the flotilla leader saying that he was in rather a hot spot and asking to take us off before the pre-arranged hour. It was then about 0250 hrs. We replied that he could come in 10 minutes - i.e. at 0300 hrs. He was, however somewhat late, and at 0310 hrs we fired a rocket - red over green -, and the troops on either side came in towards us so that we eventually formed a single beach head. They were ordered to re-embark immediately, for it was decided to use them as cover in order to strengthen the perimeter, for there was still no sign of our patrol.

A little later we began to re-embark, wading in the sea up to our arm pits. The patrol, having seen the rocket returned in about 20 minutes and reembarked among the last to go aboard. I formed the impression that the Germans were very very thin on the ground. We all re-embarked, however, with one casualty, a man who was shot through both ankles through failing to answer a challenge, another who also failed to do so was lucky, because the Tommy gun pointed at him did not go off, as it was clogged with sand.

On the return journey the plan was to go helter skelter to Dungeness under our own power. It was slightly muddled. Everyone was wet through, but we jogged gaily towards England. Only one of the A.L.Cs could get both her
engines going.

It grew light about 0630. Then many aircraft appeared, and we were picked up by an M.L. about 0930. We got aboard the M.L. and we were all by that time wet and cold and were given tea, but the Captain of the M.L. said he would have to tow us to Dover. While we were making arrangements to do so an M.G.B. turned up. It took us on board and towed the A.L.C.s on to Dover, where we arrived about 1230.

Vice Admiral commanding at Dover came out to meet us in his barge. I gave him a preliminary report and we then all went back to the redout.

The story of the carpet slippers was that they were ordinary bedroom slippers, kept on the feet by strong elastic bands. Ennis, who wore them did so because he had no gym shoes.


Cheers