New D-Day vehicles for the Canadian army

[derk derin]

Hi all,
I was watching an old video of the Bill Gregg CMP get together in the mid 80's and found it very interesting the guests he had that were part of the whole picture of design and development of Canadian production of military vehicles and one fact I had never heard before that one of the guest speakers mentioned was that he recommended that the Canadian Army have all brand new vehicles for the Normandy invasion at a cost of I believe $130,000,000.00 which he said was approved and done.Can anyone add to this story as my copy of the tape had been a copy of copies and the sound was poor.I saw Phil Waterman come up and ask questions to the guests,maybe you can confirm this story? I thought it was an interesting fact that somebody didn't want to use vehicles that had been worn out and started the invasion with new vehicles.I would also like to know if there is a copy of this tape still around with good audio to hear the rest of the stories they had to tell.
Derk.

[peter simundson]

I have been working with the Unit vets for years and personally talked the ears off some Carrier guys. All the Vehicles issued and used on D Day were fresh from War Stores. They were a little reluctant to do this but were ordered to. Some of the later followup vehicles were Unit Resources but on D Day...New Vehicles.
Not only that the third Division had new weapons, Uniforms and web. The helmets were the Mk 3 style , the web was Brit. web with web "D"'s, and the uniforms were Canadian style British made. With the exception of the Brens the weapons were new Brit made stens and Enfields.

P Simundson

[Ed Storey]

Can the statement about the uniforms and equipment for the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division being issued new kit for the Normandy invasion be supported with primary source documentation? I do know that certain specific new 'invasion related' kit such as Mk III Helmets, Boots, Assault Jerkins and Lightweight Respirators were issued for the invasion, but to completely re-equip the whole division with clothing is new to me. I was at the event that was held by Bill Gregg and yes the vehicles were replaced because for the most part after several years of wear, tear, exercises and multiple drivers, the B vehicles at least were pretty clapped out. As well, the newer B vehicles were No. 13 cabs and it only makes sense to start the campaign with new B vehicles. In the case of the A vehicles, many were already new and they do not recieve the heavy useage that B vehicles do so I would doubt that they would all get replaced, although I am not sure what was done with the Universal Carriers.

Getting back to weapons, to be frank, it would not make sense to replace all of the small arms just for the sake of newness when they do not wear out as fast as mechanical transport. You also have to look at the 'big picture' as the cost in time and material to manufacture items and then ship them to the UK would mean that just replacing things to have new, in the case of uniforms and equipment, would not necessarily make sense. Anyway, if the uniform statement can be supported with documentation, then fine.

[derk derin]

Peter,
Do you have any info on when they began to produce the new vehicles and how long it took to build up the right amount of vehicles for the invasion?
Bill Gregg's book Canada's fighting vehicles was aparently copied from an original list of vehicles needed and picked for the invasion from what I understand.Were the pictures that were taken of the vehicles already produced and in England ready to use for D-Day or were the pictures a visual list of what to order and build for the planned invasion?

Ed,
I have been a collector of Canadian webbing and equipment for 25+ years now and have always wondered when the British equipment was first used by the Canadians.I can see battledress being readily available and issued as needed but who makes the decision to try new equipment like the MK 3 or 4 helmets,the battle jerkin and other items not normally issued to Canadian troops.
Derk.

[peter simundson]

Regarding the Uniforms. I have Invasion worn Uniforms. They are Canadian style (no outside buttons) and British made. The high boots were 3rd Div. Well known, as are the helmets. The webbing is British made and marked. Easily spotted by the Canvas D's. I have several sets of it all. Two were worn by the vets that gave it to me.
After the Invasion relaced material was from Canadian Stores.
And the invasion battledress had thad gas coating on it that hardened from the water.
Imagine coming ashore in a totally soaked Bd. uniform with all pouches and packs filled with water. What fun.

Simundson

[Ed Storey]

There are several questions and responses happening at the same time from this thread with regards to uniforms and I will attempt to add something to this.

When it comes to the design, manufacture and issue of clothing and equipment for the most part, Canadian uniform designs stemmed from the UK. Not everything, but if we look at in this case just BD, boots, web and helmets, the Canadian Army worn items that were designed in the UK. Generally this was because the Canadian Army was part of the British Empire in which the doctrine, tactics and equipment were all British, therefore you could in theory have British, Canadian and say Indian troops all fight side-by-side essentially using the same ‘stuff’, and fighting using the same methods.

Uniforms and equipment constantly evolve so at some point through testing and evaluation there would be a new design for a field uniform or a helmet, I have no documentary proof, but I am speculating that examples would have been sent to the various countries for trials and potentially adapting. In the case of Canada who would be manufacturing its much of its own clothing and equipment a decision would have to be made as to if the new item would be adopted and if so was there the budget and resources. All of this would have to be looked at in the overall scheme of Imperial defence and if you look at Canada during the Great War were we manufactured clothing and equipment that was not compatible with UK, the items had to be replaced once the army was in the field so the details of who would pay and how much stuff would have to be worked out. If Canada adopted a new item, then there is also the decision of how many and if the item will be made in Canada or purchased from the UK. All of this procurement is not taken lightly and there is more to it then the average collector knows and I do not profess to be a supply expert.

In the case of Mk III Helmets, it was the ‘new’ helmet and the decision would have to have been made as to if the whole Army was going to get this helmet, what would be done with the Mk II Helmets already in stock and who would make it. What you have is a decision to purchase a limited number of MK III Helmets from the UK, primarily for 3rd Division and to use up the stock and retain the Mk II for general issue. For sure someone was keeping track of the number of MK IIIs and Mk IV Helmets used by Canada and someone in the Canadian military would have stipulated who could or could not get the helmet and some sort of reckoning would have taken place at the end of the war; as we all know Canada did not adopt the Mk III and did not manufacture it.

Uniforms and web would go through the same process. Obviously in Canada, in the case of BD and web, the issue kit would be Canadian manufacture and you would take this kit with you when you sailed for Europe. Once in Europe, if something needed replacing, they the individual would take whatever were given from QM. Now Canada tried to make sure that the Canadians wore Canadian manufactured goods, especially in the case of BD which was of a better quality and looked a little different. But, if there were not Canadian items available in the supply system, then obviously British or whatever (could be Indian in Italy) would have to do. In the case of webbing, 1st and 2nd Divisions went to the UK in 1908 Pattern Web and replaced it with UK manufactured 1937 Pattern Web and common sense would dictate that you are not going to force two complete divisions to re-equip with Canadian made web at a latter date just so everyone had Canadian made. Obviously personnel coming into those formations from Canada would have Canadian made web. As items were replaced, you could potentially see a mix of UK and Canadian web and in fact this is common in sets obtained from Veterans.

Now the topic of uniforms and equipment for 3rd Division for Normandy, unless someone can come up with a document that proves that the whole of 3rd Division was issued new uniforms and equipment for Neptune, I tend to doubt it was done. As I stated, for B vehicles yes, it makes sense, but not uniforms. Specialist clothing for the invasion was issued to some of the sub-formations of the division, such as Mk III Helmets, boots and Assault Jerkins, but even this was not division wide. Yes, the BD was suppose to have been anti-gas treated, if this was division-wide, I have no idea.

As for having uniforms that landed at Normandy, fought at Vimy Ridge or took part in the Battle at Kap Yong, I tend to think that owning a uniform from any of these key battles is very wishful thinking on the part of the owner. Veterans, god love them, are wonderful people and they may tell you that they wore the uniform at such a key battle but you have to think, what are the chances of a person wearing, every day, the same uniform from June 1944 until May 1945 and then wearing it back to Canada? I can see having webbing, a helmet, a respirator or a razor that could well have landed at Normandy, but to have a uniform that not only survived 11 months of day-to-day wear but also the communal unit laundry system and the odd chance to exchange worn clothing for newer; boggles my very simple mind.

[servicepub (RIP)]

Ed makes some very valid points. Canada had a policy, accepted by the UK, that certain items were to be "of continuing Canadian supply". This list included clothing, vehicles, insignia and small arms. There were a few acceptable exceptions to this such as any No4T could be issued to a Canadian formation rather than issue only Long Branch-made examples.
For those who are not aware, the UK charged Canada for any issues of British kit. In the early days the Canadian Army paid rent for British vehicles and then, later, bought vehicles outright. In return, Canada charged the UK for CMP's bren guns, Sniper rifles, optics, etc...
This meant that both sides employed a shadow army of accountants who kept track of who owed whom how much. At various times Canada (who was always owed money by the Brits) made a grant to the UK. In fact, when the Mutual Aid Act was passed the very first grant was for a Billion dollars - which covered Britain's war costs for a year.

[peter simundson]

I operate a Museum for the Queens Own Rifles. In the Museum I have at least seven original sets of Battledress from WW2. The nicest one was invasion worn and given to me by the guy who wore it. On June 8th he was
winged in the head and sent back to England to recover. Two weeks later
when he was at his "girlfriends" the Provost (he got daily passes) picked him up and delivered him to base to return to his Unit. He was in civvies, was outfitted at base and RTU'd. He survived the war and picked up his Kit on the way home. It was hanging in the basement in the original bag, with helmet, when he gave it to me. Five years ago I picked up a Kit from a Sgt. MM winner. I wanted his MM but got two sets of Battledress. One he returned home in. It had the red lanyard, rank machine stitched on and about a dozen pleats on the back. A new Cdn made uniform. The other was a well worn, pants and tunic, that he wore on the invasion and through the war.
I also have the CO's tunic, trousers and web (camo'd with dark capo yet)
(Col. Steve Lett). The rest of the uniforms are WW2 but not invasion.
If you take the time to check out paybooks and message books you will find that the sgts and section commanders made a list of weapons issued to their troops. They dont have Canadian serial numbers. Although later in the war
Canadian Long Branch Numbers start turning up.
I deal with fact. Not Part 2 orders. Or coffee table books.
In the defence of history when I say Third Div. I refer to the invading troops. Not support troops or Att's and det's that came in later or on day 2.
More on the actual vehicles later
Simundson

[Ed Storey]

Now we have the full story, I wish you had provided those details earlier as you had me believing that you had some mythical BD uniform tht had travelled all through NW Europe.

The well-worn BD in the kit bag is interesting, but how do you know it was field used?

It is nice that you represent the QOR Museum, but to be frank, museums are some of the biggest offenders for glossing over the details, especially when it comes to material history. I asked you about your original earlier post, "Not only that the third Division had new weapons, Uniforms and web. The helmets were the Mk 3 style , the web was Brit. web with web "D"'s, and the uniforms were Canadian style British made. With the exception of the Brens the weapons were new Brit made stens and Enfields." Specifically if you had any primary source material to back up the statement or is this just a theory of yours?

I am glad you deal in more than just Part II Orders and coffee table books, so I will press you again to see if you have any primary source data to back up your statment? Nothing would impress me more if you could provide the QOR QM returns for Mk III Helmets or a written order from the QOR CO directing everyone in the regiment to draw new BD prior to the invasion.

[Ed Storey]

Bill Gregg's book was based on this Canadian WWII Vehicle Data Book.

[derk derin]

I was wondering if the pictures were taken for a visual list of vehicles to build for the invasion but I read the introduction of Bill's book and he writes that Canadian army photographers went to various camps a few months prior to D-Day and took the pictures so I guess that answered my question.I have to stop looking at all the pretty pictures and do a little more reading!
Does anybody have a number of vehicles the Canadian army needed for the D-Day invasion?
Derk.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

I have something to add to this from DND papers studied by me. However, that may take time, and in the meantime can add that vehicle assembly in the UK was very slow in the period uo to the beginning of 1944. I allude to this in my book on Pearsons of Liverpool who were charged with holding a massive crates storage facility, along with one or two other sites.

For Canadian-UK monetary aid see my Paper at:
http://www.gmhistorian.btinternet.co...IANDOLLARS.htm

. Basically, from 1941 there was an agreement to supply Australia, NZ, and probably SA, with vehicles, equipment, etc. and payment was to be made through High Commissions in London. I suppose it was an equivalent of a 'Clearing House' with settlements either way. There must have been an awful lot of paperwork done in Canberra, Ottawa, Auckland, Pretoria, which was then sent to London!

As is known the UK and the US also agreed a 'Reverse Lend-Lease' for vehicles, aircraft, etc. and the same general agreement over supplies to the other Dominions is documented.

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

This is an extract for your info:

PEARSON’S GARAGE AT WAR


.....The factory received a direct hit during a bombing raid in late 1940, but as the walls were left standing a new roof of asbestos sheeting was erected over the workshop and production resumed. Following a meeting with General Motors Limited held at Cuerdon Mill, Bamber Bridge, near Preston in the Spring of 1941, it was decided that Pearson’s workshops were ideally placed for receiving supplies of vehicles being imported from Canada and the USA. The old woollen mill had probably been located for GM Ltd by Pearsons’ who had been and continued to be into the early post-war years, one of their major dealers. This followed the bombing of the Southampton Plant which contained the original Canadian Mechanization Depot, and the loss of military vehicle assembly, and civilian vehicle repairing and spare parts facilities there. Liverpool was also in an area of high Luftwaffe activity, but the port was the nerve centre of the Atlantic convoy routes. Southampton, on the other hand, saw most of its commercial maritime activity being transferred to the Clyde, the Mersey and Bristol Channel ports. Accordingly the Ministries of Supply and of War Production allowed General Motors, Ford of Dagenham, Essex and Chrysler/Dodge of Kew, Surrey to establish assembly plants nearer to these ports. Pearsons’ were to take full advantage of the situation.
Pearsons’ workshops in Liverpool were the central focus of the operation. Despite suffering a direct hit in the winter of 1940/41, the patched-up building with its ever-leaking roof was kept more or less fully operational, even at the height of the Merseyside blitz.
During the years that followed, Pearsons’ assembled thousands of ‘Knocked Down’ (KD) and Partly Knocked Down (PKD) from across the Atlantic, most of which were shipped from America or Canada as crated deck cargo. Liverpool was one of five receiving ports for this kind of traffic, the others being Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow and Newport. However, Liverpool seems to have been the main centre. Once the cargo had been off-loaded at Liverpool, it was rapidly shipped out of the city by rail and taken to three wooded sites at Burscough, Ormskirk and one other (as yet) un-identified location, but almost certainly Cuerdon Mill. At these dumps a camouflage system was employed to disguise the crated trucks from the air, and from these ‘safe’ stores the crates would be taken back (two or three at a time) on low-loaders to Pearsons’ workshops in the city. Here they would be assembled by a small core of men in reserved occupations, who were aided by a number of youths, ‘retired’ men, and an army of women workers. The firm assembled vehicles for the British, Canadian and US forces and possibly uniquely, this included Jeeps for all three forces, then handled war-surplus Jeeps post-war for the civilian market. To these should be added large numbers of British vehicles shipped back for refurbishment and further service under Ministry of Supply contracts, and former US and possibly Canadian, vehicles acquired by the Ministry for the British forces and also essential civilian users and the Ministry of Food Production.
The assembly of vehicles in the UK for the Canadian forces preceded by several months those supplied by Canada to M of S demands, placed in Ottawa in late June 1940. This also coincided with huge diverted French orders for some Canadian but mostly US-sourced vehicles, some time before Defence Aid supplies that were then succeeded by Lend-Lease supplies. By January 1941 the first British supplies from Canada started to arrive, in the UK and overseas as required. In the UK the M of S took over responsibility for all War Department and Air Ministry vehicles (not Admiralty for the Royal Navy and Marines) had to arrange for Canadian-order vehicles not able to be assembled in the new CMD (part of Citröen Cars Ltd, Slough, Buckinghamshire) and Lep Transport Ltd (depot in Chiswick, west London) which were under direct contract with the Canadian Government, in other locations. The Ministry contracted with GM Ltd for British Chevrolet orders to be assembled for a short time in Bamber Bridge, and Fords in Dagenham although Ford then set up additional premises. Dodge and Fargo trucks probably went to Kew, but the Ministry subsequently contracted numerous companies around the country to assemble both British and Canadian orders from North America. During 1941 on behalf of the Canadian Government the Ministry appointed Lep Transport in Goole on the Humber, Pearson’s, Tom Garner Ltd of Pendleton, Manchester, and Wm. Alexander & Sons of Falkirk to assemble Canadian-order vehicles. However by the summer of 1942, months after the US entered the war, assembly of Canadian vehicles reached a low level because of shipping problems and lack of components, and very little assembly was undertaken by any of the then M of S “supply plants”. The backlog reached 10,497 vehicles awaiting shipment from Canada but then in late 1942 shipping space greatly increased and the backlog shifted, which required dumps to be set up in Port Talbot and Brands to relieve plant congestion. This coincided with heavy shipments for the M of S and US forces that were assembled all over the UK as well. During 1943 the quantity of Canadian Army vehicles required increased as did those received from Canada which exceeded expectations. The M of S had agreed in June 1943 a 17% share of total M of S assembly plant capacity which was supposed to be 17,500 vehicles per month, but the Canadians had more inventory stored than the two other forces. At the same time, crates with US vehicles assembled by the M of S in the TILEFER plants which, like Pearson’s assembled British and Canadian vehicles “were piling up at an alarming rate” as production fell behind. The Canadians stated that lack of suitable labour caused extreme difficulty in maintaining quality workmanship and increased productivity. By August Citröen’s and Lep Transport were required to increase output through additional capacity and Brands were directly-contracted in September, to increase production to 3,000 units/month. However it was decided that to equip the First Canadian Army for future operations, and the various huge Canadian crate dumps, a 6,000 units/month was necessary. The answer lay with the establishment from 1st October of 1 CEAU at Bordon, Hampshire, a military assembly operation which achieved in a few weeks 3,000 units/month on top of the civilian output (1,013 and 1,866 from Pearson’s alone in 1942 & 1943) until requirements were met in April 1944, shortly before the Normandy invasion. Only replacement vehicles were required subsequently, able to be provided from civilian plants, some of which were no longer needed: 30th June saw Brand’s contract cancelled and similar arrangements made to dispose of surplus stock. Citröen’s received the remaining inventory from the CEAU during May and all material utilised by year end. Brands however continued to operate a Canadian dump so material was readily absorbed from there. The US requirements were met by establishing Motor Vehicle Assembly or MVA companies, with military personnel at eight depots including possibly an existing one in Wern and from January 1944, Bromborough, both near Liverpool
The M of S also had a heavy reduction in requirements, particularly in the LIEFER programme and they closed a number of their plants in the latter half of 1944. The US MVA assembly work began to slacken toward the end of 1943 because the cased vehicles of the most wanted types were not arriving in sufficient numbers. General Lee, the commanding general of Services of supply or SOS, directed that the crates that came in were to be sent to M of S plants in order to keep them operating at capacity, even though the US plants were idle, because the British plants would be badly needed in the spring when the requirements would bring enormously increased shipments. Most of the seven MVA companies that arrived between January and May 1944 were sent to work in British case dumps near the ports, which may have included Pearson’s one in Ormskirk, which evidently included US vehicles. By the end of December 1944 Canadian assembly from M of S plants had dropped to 800 units/month: Pearson’s contribution being 2,106 bringing the total to 5,834. By 8th May 1945 production had dropped to 400 units/month. Citröen’s reduced their staff and output by then to 400-500 p/month, with monthly total of 800-90 p/month.
Subsequently Canadian production was reduced to just six plants, with Citroën’s operating under direct contract and Pearson’s and five others under M of S contract, assembling 150 vehicles per week. By 30th June 1945 requirements had been finalised and running down to closure scheduled. However the M of S whilst also faced with a considerable reduction in demand, had much greater finalised requirements and Canadian production concluded whilst the plants were still running. It was also agreed with the M of S that it was uneconomical to maintain eight storage dumps, some jointly with the Canadians but Citröen’s and Brand’s under direct contract. Consolidation by movement of all Canadian vehicle cases was completed by 31st October into the Slough and Manchester dumps plus Pearson’s. The last Canadian-order vehicles assembled by Citroen’s was on 25th September and Pearson’s on 8th October 1945, and whilst a further 5,971 Canadian vehicles were in the three dumps. Pearson’s presumably incorporated British-order vehicles as well. A few “passenger cars” which probably meant Chevrolet C8A eight-cwt HUP CMPs, to be received and all of these had not been received by December 1945 [the last Canadian contract being CDLV 3619], and so the M of S arranged for uncrating and assembly in one of their plants that they were keeping going for some time: Lep Transport in Chiswick had ceased assembly in 1944, and in Goole sometime in 1945. Pearson’s assembled 1,903 Canadian vehicles in 1945, bringing the total to 7,737 out of total of 88,401 to October 1945 by 33 plants. The last British orders included Demand S/M 6407 and 6524 for C8A 1C11 Staff Cars, one to the former assembled in Oshawa 31st August 1945, although the plant stopped wartime production around mid-September. The highest known Ford contract was for three-ton F.60L units to Contract S/M 6537, but a known F60L/WP was built to contract SM-6537 on 4th September 1945, and the Auto Workers’ Strike started on the 12th, so this would seem to indicate roughly when final shipping to the UK commenced.
Disposal in the US of surplus military vehicles had started in 1944, being handled by the then War Assets Disposals Board to a market eager for any vehicles. During July and August 1945 the Canadian Morrison Mission arrived in the UK to determine what vehicles should be returned to Canada for the use by the post-war Army, and then requested 2,624 cased vehicles which were immediately shipped back. A further 3,229 vehicles were held in abeyance pending a deal with the War Office or other agencies regarding their disposal, and continued to be held until at least November 1945.. Of the remaining vehicles, only 169 were found surplus to Army requirements consisting mostly of tractor units without the cancelled semi-trailers. Some of the cases remaining in the dumps had stood as long as three years by end of June and a large percentage needed repairs before they could be shipped. With the co-operation of the M of S and the operators of the dumps, the case repair programme was carried out in three to four weeks and all residual cases by the November were able to withstand a sea voyage back. By then 1,965 vehicles had been shipped and 659 were held up be a Dockers’ strike and shipping restrictions. Those vehicles not disposed off ultimately in the UK and on the Continent were able to be donated to organisations and countries for humanitarian work, such as the UNRRA
Any vehicles and spare parts not likewise reclaimed by the US Government were dealt with at war’s end under the “Settlement for Lend-Lease, Reciprocal Aid, Surplus War Property and Claims” effected on 6th December 1945, and as regards Canadian stocks by the War Claims Settlement between the United Kingdom and Canada, concluded on 6th March 1946. The agreement settled all claims between the two Governments arising from the disposal in the United Kingdom of surplus war assets of the Government of Canada or from the disposal in Canada of surplus UK war assets. Therefore, any US- or Canadian-owned vehicles, generators, trailers, etc left in the UK and not reclaimed by their respective Governments, were able to be disposed of by the British Government, acting presumably through the M of S.
In 1944, just as the first wholesale disposals of obsolete vehicles was undertaken by the M of S , the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders agreed with the Government what became known as the “SMMT Scheme”. This gave priority on the disposal of surplus vehicles to the UK manufacturers, eg Chevrolet and GMC to General Motors Ltd, Ford and Fordson to Ford Motor Co Ltd, etc and also to the manufacturer’s dealers and contractors although they could also bid wholesale in M of S disposals as well. This excluded vehicles retained by the M of S that were rebuilt for further post-war service or transfer to fire services, Salvage Corps, etc. Further, Vauxhall Motors do not appear to have exercised their rights in respect of passenger cars or Bedfords though Pearson’s were able to.

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

Originally Posted by edstorey

Now we have the full story, I wish you had provided those details earlier as you had me believing that you had some mythical BD uniform tht had travelled all through NW Europe.

The well-worn BD in the kit bag is interesting, but how do you know it was field used?

It is nice that you represent the QOR Museum, but to be frank, museums are some of the biggest offenders for glossing over the details, especially when it comes to material history. I asked you about your original earlier post, "Not only that the third Division had new weapons, Uniforms and web. The helmets were the Mk 3 style , the web was Brit. web with web "D"'s, and the uniforms were Canadian style British made. With the exception of the Brens the weapons were new Brit made stens and Enfields." Specifically if you had any primary source material to back up the statement or is this just a theory of yours?

I am glad you deal in more than just Part II Orders and coffee table books, so I will press you again to see if you have any primary source data to back up your statment? Nothing would impress me more if you could provide the QOR QM returns for Mk III Helmets or a written order from the QOR CO directing everyone in the regiment to draw new BD prior to the invasion.

Peter Peter Peter. If only you knew something about WW2 and the military. If only you didn't fall for fake vet's stories. If only you accepted things only after you found the original order that authorized them. Dam, only 40 (maybe 50?) years at this game. What do you know???

Then (oh you really gone and done it) you don't write the entire history of everything you know IN YOUR POST ON A SILLY INTERNET FORUM...well then, there's no hope for you.

You must feel so ashamed.

[Ed Storey]

Bruce, I will take your post in the jest it was intended...

I don't care if someone has been in the game 50 years or 5 days, posting theories without being able to provide some form of primary source proof is just adding the the litany of myths and half-truths that exist in this industry. There is nothing that would make me happier then to have someone attach a scan from a document of CO giving instruction to draw BD for the invasion or what ever, but so far, I have not seen anything.

Vets are great people, we own them a lot and they achieved great things, but they are human. Stories from Vets about kit, weapons, locations, events or daring do are just that, stories. Most Vets didn't give a rat’s backside about what they were issued or when, so enjoy the stories, right them down, but they are but one piece of the puzzle, to base a theory on one piece and one piece only is not good methodology.

I am a Vet, from UNPROFOR, it was 17 years ago. If I told you that we had to paint our issue helmets blue when we got them in Croatia because Canada had to get there fast from Germany an there was not time to paint them in Lahr. Would you believe me? Remember, I was there, I am a Vet (and to boot I have 30 years collecting experience).

[servicepub (RIP)]

Originally Posted by peter simundson

I deal with fact. Not Part 2 orders. Or coffee table books. Simundson

Wow. I have never been accused of that before.
All of my books are based on historical record and I would prefer to rely on that than on the 60+ year memory of a veteran. Further, any individual CO may order or condone changes to Orders but it is the study of these Orders that tells us what the Army's intent was. It is Part 2 Orders that are fact - not the reminiscences of a veteran or the provenance of a uniform. I respect your knowledge and experience but your sweeping statements about wholesale replacement of all categories of materiel is hard to swallow.
There is written support that all units, prior to embarkation, were to report shortfalls in their War Establishment. In all cases material was supplied at the embarkation point with British material - this included motorcycles, vehicles and smal arms and allowed for the replacement of material which was lost on the way to the embarkation point. Obviously the "Continuing Canadian Supply" policy was not observed in these cases.
I don't understand the comment about British-made Canadian uniforms. The reason the Brits were making their economy pattern was because of their shortage of wool. If they were to re-clothe Canadians they would either do it with stocks of Canadian BD or they would issue British pattern BD, not a Brit-made Canadian pattern - and in which colour, British or Canadian?
In any event, until I see documented evidence or other primary sources I will file this one as an interesting story.

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

All that occurred with a quarter million troops in WW2, and elsewhere for that matter, is not going to be found in orders or have a document trail.

And all that you say about museums, second hand stories from vets and wishful thinking is mostly true.

But this is Peter Simundson we're talking about. If you knew him, or had dealt with him, you'll know his knowledge and experience will turn out to be better informed than you can otherwise prove with documents. Not one to exaggerate or make things up is Peter. Quite the opposite. He's one to listen to it all and sort out the likely from the crap.

Coffee table books. Now you take that back!!

[peter simundson]

In a few posts Vet's (which we are supposed to love and respect) have been called liars and unreliable sources, a uniform I've got on the rack doesnt exist in a canadian pattern and colour and a British maker's name, even though the guy who says it doesn't has never seen it, Clive, who has done a great job publishing a series of informative Canadian books calls himself a "coffee table" book publisher,(coffee table books are 99 cents at the remainder sale at bookstores and you all know what they are) and, a guy I've never met says I don't know what I've got here and it's all fake.
Boys the fakes are on E Bay and they turn up all the time. The crap is at the Militaria Shows and it's "original" ss uniforms and Canadian battledress jackets that a month ago had no flashes and now is 3rd div. original d day. It's kangaroo badges aged with a blowtorch or whatever.
I'll give up annoying all you experts now. No more posts. I've had three phone calls asking me what's going on.
Who is this Bruce Parker guy anyway??? Seems to me someone said he had a perfectly restored Fox (all covered with red fur?) and carrier. Both ground up Museum quality. Bruce I see a complete original list of WW2 Tac sign markings in your future.

Simundson

[David_Hayward (RIP)]

May I just pick-up the reference to wool for uniforms? The Ministry of Supply acquired the whole Australian wool clip in 1939, thus frustrating as a coincidence, German plans to exchange wool for Opel cars and possibly trucks. I assume that as the war dragged on the availability of spare wool not required for the AEF etc. and shipping problems meant that the supply sagged? Excuse pun!

Reference to coffee table books reminds that I co-authored one: it was designed to be landscape format so as to sit nicely on tables! Regrettably only a handful of Canadian vehicle photos though. Of course, the discovery of 220 professional photos in a tin box that had survived unscathed was a miracle. It did however provide irrefutable evidence where relevant!

[malcolm erik bogaert]

this is what makes the MLU furum best in the world....it gets down to the nitty gritty....best regards from a rather wet north-northumberland . malcolm

[Ed Storey]

Peter, please reread my posts. Nowhere did I say that Veterans were liars, that is your wordiong and your take on what was posted. As for using Veterans as sources, they are but one source, a human source.

With respect to Peter, I always find it strange that when people are challenged to support their statements and theories with some form of tangable proof, ie documents or at times even photographs they start with a 'smoke screen' in this case you work at the QOR Museum and then also fall back on how many years collecting they have. Both of those credentials are great, but where are the facts? Once the 'smoke screen' thins and they still cannot provide any supporting proff then it is the old story, of not ever going to post agian because the 'experts' are giving me a hard time. Peter, you work at the QOR Museum, you are sitting on what could potentially be a huge resource of information, mine it, find the answers and post them, don't run off.

[Ed Storey]

Damn I forgot to run it through spell check before posting, disregard the typos...

[Bruce Parker (RIP)]

I work for a very large organization. Our head office routinely sends out directives, instructions and records the activities of the branch offices. In practice, 10% of it is followed, and even less of what goes on is recorded. Should someone want to study and analyze my employer's organization 60 years from now, and relied on the written record, they would get a woefully distorted picture of how things are today. There's a theory that says to understand the past, look to the forces that drive the present.

In my line of work, we rely on 'best evidence' when original evidence is not forthcoming. There's also a 'priority of evidence' rule: physical evidence is most reliable, followed by secondary evidence that reasonably dates to a time when original evidence existed and last, oddly enough, written records. The thinking is that you rely on those things humans are least likely to mistake. I haven't been fired yet so I must be doing something right.

And I don't think it's running off. It's more selecting where you choose to share your knowledge.

[servicepub (RIP)]

Originally Posted by Bruce Parker

I haven't been fired yet so I must be doing something right.

Actually, you just haven't been caught yet

[horsa]

One problem with written records and orders is they are a snapshot of what was in theory to take place at a given time. Without analysis of documents issued following that time and a study of the physical evidence including photographs, you won't know if a given set of orders were followed or the plan was revised or abandoned completely by later orders. Look at Army Council Instructions as an example of ever changing procedures to normal documented practices. And even then you can’t rely exclusively on the documents since the units may not have all received them or in some cases didn’t follow them for various other reasons.

Overall a tough forensic exercise.

[servicepub (RIP)]

David,
I don't disagree with this. Orders, and any written instructions, are there to give an overall direction in which to proceed. Good managers invariably implement these instructions taking into consideration the resources available to them, the manpower restraints, local conditions, etc... and this causes them to weave along the path - staggering from side to side but still moving in the general direction.
If everyone were to go in their own direction - which could be 180 degrees off-track, then there would be no order. The result would be chaos and armies are not generally know for that.
Clive
"No plan ever survives the Start-Line"

[Bruce MacMillan]

In researching the policy of supply and provision of wireless sets I found that the initial policy was made by beerocrats in Ottawa, mostly followed by the CAO HQ in London and modified by the field. In 1943 the policy was to equip Canadian AFVs & light recce vehicles with the Canadian WS19.

Reading an after action report from Operation Husky, the 1st Div was ordered to replace their CDN sets with British sets. It was presumed that preparations were made in such haste & secrecy that the compatibility of the two sets were not understood by those theater commanders making the decisions. Contrary to policy the "holdings on embarkation" show the CDN sets being withdrawn & replace by British units.

Documents further into 1943 & 1944 show that supply & demand and feedback from the field caused the policies to be modified. In a sense the tail wagged the dog.

I agree with Clive in that these "policies" are guidelines,subject to change,all working towards a common goal.

[Mark W. Tonner]

Gentlemen;

I didn’t really want to get involved in this discussion, but I’ve been following it since the thread started. To basically say that a unit ‘Officer Commanding’ did what they liked and basically ignored set down policy/orders/directives, is pure and simple rubbish. As Clive pointed out “If everyone were to go in their own direction - which could be 180 degrees off-track, then there would be no order. The result would be chaos and armies are not generally known for that”, this is certainly true of the Canadian Army of 1944. Even though 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was under command of the I British Corps (Second British Army) at the time of the invasion, the policy/orders/directives as set down by higher headquarters would most certainly have been implemented by the Canadian ‘Officer Commanding’ at the various levels of command within the division as these policies/orders/directives reached him and he implemented them within his command.

Moving on, the events being discussed in this thread occurred 65 years ago and as we all know, the more time passes, the more the details fade, so much so, that at some point the memories of someone who was there those 65 years ago cannot entirely be relied upon to give us the complete details of what he was issued with or of what the exact colour of it was or whether it was of Canadian or British manufacture, etc. This is why it as been asked earlier in this thread if any form of an ‘official’ paper trial had been found that stated, for example: that bright pink bow ties were to be worn by the section commanders in the infantry battalions, or that platoon commanders were to wear black top hats as a form of easy identification by the men under their command ... the point I’m trying to make is that, if a man 65 years on says that his whole unit was issued with British manufactured BD prior to the invasion, or that all of his unit’s small arms were replaced prior to the invasion, there would be a paper trail left that would document the policy/order/directive that lead to this man’s whole battalion having been issued with British manufactured BD or of his unit having had all of their small arms replaced prior to the invasion.

Such paper trails do existence and in the case of the Canadian Army of 1944, these are held at Library and Archives Canada under Records Group number 24. Although it can be a pain in the ass to sift through the documents, you are more then likely to find a copy of that policy/order/directive that directed section commanders to wear bright pink bow ties and platoon commanders to wear black top hats those 65 years ago, mind you, sometimes you’ll find the document that implemented a policy/order/directive in the most unlikely of files, but the paper trail is there at Library and Archives Canada and in the case of the Canadian Army of 1944, it can be found within Records Group number 24.

For the purposes of the subject of this thread and since the original discussion seems to be around an infantry battalion (and for those who are interested in reading the actual policy/order/directive that implemented this or that those 65 years ago, and for those willing to sift through the files), the documents pertaining to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and the various statements and questions raised in this thread, can possibly be found within the following files at Library and Archives Canada:

Assistant Director of Ordnance Services, 3rd Canadian Division:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 16044
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 16045

3rd Canadian Infantry Division - Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 13775, Reel T-10532
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 13776, Reel T-10533

3rd Canadian Infantry Division - General Staff:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 13765, Reel T-7620
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 13766, Reel T-7620

Headquarters, 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14127, Reel T-12013
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14128, Reel T-12014

Headquarters, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14138, Reel T-12157
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14139, Reel T-12158

Headquarters, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14151, Reel T-12330
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 14152, Reel T-12331

Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine Gun):
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15025
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15026

Regina Rifle Regiment:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15197
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15198

Royal Winnipeg Rifles:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15233

Canadian Scottish Regiment:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15035
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15036

Queen's Own Rifles:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15168

Le Régiment de la Chaudière:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15180

North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15126
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15127

Highland Light Infantry of Canada:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15075
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15076

Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15269
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15270

North Nova Scotia Highlanders:
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15121
- RG24, National Defence, Series C-3, Volume 15122


Cheers

[derk derin]

Gentlemen,
This is the first time using the computer for following and learning about the items I collect.I have been collecting Canadian Military equipment since my cadet days when I was 13 and never stopped.Up until now they were just items but now with everybody's input on where and how it was issued and used has opened my eyes as to the story of these great relics.I can see there is more than one opinion on the subject and am enjoying learning from it but would not like to see anybody get frustrated and quit discussions as it is interesting to hear different points of view.I hope Peter and others can add input on the issue and usage of equipment used by the Canadian Army.
Regards,Derk.

[Ed Storey]

Clive and Mark:

Thank you,

ED