[MicS]

As a complement to the above, the following extract from "The Westminster Dragoons in North-West Europe June 1944 - May 1945" provides some additional details (my highlights in Bold):

Broekhuizen
Towards the end of November 1944 there were only one or two pockets of German resistance left west of the River Maas. One such pocket was that at the village of BROEKHUIZEN on the west bank of the river and the neighbouring KASTEEL, where a company of tough paratroops from 20 Para Regiment were holding out. Supplies reached them at night by means of a ferry over the river at that point. One attack on the Kasteel by a platoon of 9 Bn Cameron Highlanders had been successfully repulsed, the platoon being wiped out almost to a man. On 29 November orders were received for two troops of A Squadron to proceed from DEURNE where the Squadron was then located, to the BROEKHUIZEN area to support 3 Bn Monmouthshire Regiment of 11 Armoured Division in an attack on this strongpoint the following day. Leaving Capt P.J.S. Squirrell to bring the tanks of the Squadron up the twenty odd miles, Major Wallace went ahead with Lt Hall and Lt Cooper, the troop leaders concerned, to carry out a reconnaissance of the enemy positions and contact the troops with whom the Squadron was to co-operate. They arrived at the village of STOCKT just west of BROEKHUIZEN with only about half an hour of daylight left, and were taken forward by an officer of 3 Mons through the deserted and battered village to an observation post in the last house from which one could see across to the Kasteel about 200 yards away. One at a time they peered cautiously through a hole in the roof and saw a large and solidly built two-storied building with a moat on the near side. Of particular interest were a few small wooden pegs in the ground, which it was suspected marked the minefield. Local Dutch inhabitants had said this protected the enemy position on its south side. There was not a sign of life about the Kasteel. At intervals single shells burst in the air above it in a small black cloud, and in the failing light the place had a vaguely sinister air. The officers hurried back to the scout cars at the other end of the village as they were due almost immediately at an "O" Group at the battalion headquarters of 3 Mons a mile or so away. On arrival they met officers from the artillery and 15/19 Hussars, who were also supporting the infantry. The Colonel of the Battalion outlined the plan for the next day's attack and final details were tied up between the supporting arms and infantry. At the conclusion of orders the three officers went back up the road to a rendez-vous previously arranged with Capt Squirell and were pleased to find that he and the tanks had already arrived and were harboured along the edge of a wood. The Squadron Leader gave his orders for the following day and after a hot meal all except the guards turned in for the night, hoping that no German patrols from across the river would arrive suddenly to disturb their night's rest. The German artillery from across the Maas shelled the area spasmodically throughout the night and the sound of each shell-burst was magnified many times as it echoed and re-echoed through the silent woods. One had little idea whether they were a mile or two away or only a few hundred yards.
Next morning the flails moved off through the woods towards the start line ahead of a squadron of 15/19 Hussars who had been harbouring nearby. The route lay along a typical Dutch mud track which threatened to disintegrate at any moment beneath the weight of the tanks. Within a short time its banks had collapsed in two places, two of the flails became bogged blocking the route, and it looked as if they might prevent all the tanks behind them from reaching the start line on time. One was towed out without much loss of time and it was found just possible to get tanks past the other. At 1000 hrs the first three flails of 2 Tp advanced ahead of the infantry towards the Kasteel, the first objective, supported by mortar and artillery concentrations. The two tanks of Squadron headquarters took up positions in a gap between two small woods, from which they could engage both the Kasteel and BROEKHUIZEN, which was the objective of the second phase of the attack. After going about a hundred yards the flails started exploding mines, one was put out of action and Serjeant Bee commanding another wounded when his tank was hit by an enemy shell. The crew of the damaged tank were ordered to ''bail out" after putting down local smoke and got back safely. Another flail was sent forward to take their place and all three lanes were successfully completed to within a few yards of the Kasteel although the infantry following behind them suffered heavy casualties from the enemy artillery, which was putting down heavy and accurate fire using the Church tower at ARCEN on the other side of the Maas as an observation post. Having done their job the flails of 2 Tp returned, and were ordered to make a lane up to the Kasteel from the west. Here they ran into bad ground and both got bogged. At eleven o'clock three flails of 4 Tp under Lt Hall advanced towards BROEKHUIZEN for the second phase of the attack, and the fire of the Squadron HQ tanks, which up till now had been firing at the Kasteel and putting down smoke for 2 Tp, was switched onto this new target. One could see little spurts of flame from German machine guns among the buildings and round after round of HE was fired at the houses. The flails did their job magnificently and made lanes up to the village for the infantry, who were being held up by the enemy's machine gun fire. After completing his lane, Lt Hall's tank was hit by a bazooka and brewed up, luckily not before the crew were able to "bail out". Lt Hall and his operator, Tpr McCartney, were wounded and evacuated at once to a nearby medical post. By this time the infantry had got into BROEKHUIZEN and dealt with the enemy there. But outside the Kasteel, the defenders were putting up a desperate defence, inflicting casualties on our men every time they showed themselves outside the ditches in which they were taking cover. Orders were received to clear the route to the Kasteel from STOKT, and, sending the remainder of the flails to rally a few hundred yards to the rear, the Squadron Leader took two round to the village. One commanded by Serjeant Bailey swept the road to within a few yards of the entrance to the Kasteel and then became bogged. Major Wallace met the Colonel of 3 Mons, in STOKT and gave him what information he had. A few minutes later the Colonel of 3 Mons was killed while very gallantly trying to lead his men in person into the Kasteel. It seemed impossible for the infantry to take the place by frontal assault, and so tanks of the 15/19 Hussars came up the lanes that had been-made and bombarded it at point blank range until eventually the enemy surrendered. Operations of comparatively small scale such as this can very often be more costly to the units concerned than much larger battles. 3 Mons lost 10 officers and 100 Other Ranks in clearing up this enemy pocket and at the end of the day had a Serjeant in command of one of their Companies. During this operation A Squadron had one officer, Lt G. S. Cooper, killed and one officer and two Other Ranks wounded. A Special Order of the Day was issued by the Commanding Officer at the conclusion of this operation.

The Special Order of the Day is in the December War Diary:


Michel