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Old 27-02-07, 23:51
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John McGillivray John McGillivray is offline
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Default Operation Husky

Also you should note that in preparation for the invasion of Sicily in 1943(Operation Husky), the Canadian Army had asked for volunteers to transfer over to the reinforcement units bound for the Mediterranean; from front line units remaining in England. Many troops took the transfer in the hope of getting into action sooner.

The following is from “The Canadians in Italy” by G.W.L. Nicholson (p 37-38):

“The use of British channels for supplying from the Middle East all the material wants of the Canadian component of the Eighth Army once operations had begun could obviously not be extended to the "A" or personnel side to include the furnishing of reinforcements. Casualties in the Canadian force had to be replaced from Canadian sources—an arrangement presenting special problems which would not arise in the case of the non-Canadian formations engaged in "Husky". In an assault landing it was to be expected that initial casualties might be heavy. But whereas British and American reinforcements for the 15th Army Group would be available at short notice from depots already operating in North Africa, no such Canadian establishments existed nearer to Sicily than the United Kingdom.

“Accordingly a Canadian base reinforcement depot was planned, where reinforcements could be held in training close to the theatre of operations. For reasons of security it was not practicable to establish convenient reserves of Canadian troops in North Africa before the assault was launched. The Canadian planners therefore proposed that the headquarters and three of the battalions of the contemplated depot should be set up in North Africa on or after D Day, but that a fourth battalion of reinforcements, amounting to nearly 1500 all ranks, should be carried straight to Sicily in one of the early follow-up convoys, and thus be available within three days of the initial landings. Both the War Office and Allied Force Headquarters at first expressed doubts as to the practicability of this expedient, but they were finally convinced by the arguments which Canadian Military Headquarters presented. In the actual event the scheme quickly found its justification on the landing beaches, where every available man was required to assist in the unloading of ammunition, rations and stores; while in the fighting that followed reinforcements for the Canadian units were immediately forthcoming. On the other hand, had all the Canadian reinforcement battalions been sent to North Africa, it would have taken at least three weeks to replace early losses—a particularly serious situation in the event of the early casualties reaching their expected proportions. So convincingly did the "Husky" landings demonstrate the value of this policy that in planning the subsequent invasion of the Italian mainland the Eighth Army instructed each of its assault divisions to have 1000 reinforcements landed between D plus 3 and D plus 6.”
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