Another useful reference text is D.P. Mellor THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY. Available for download on AWM site is Chapter 23. CAMOUFLAGE, CIVIL DEFENCE AND MAPPING.
https://oldsite.awm.gov.au/images/co...070370--1-.pdf
Following excerpt gives an excellent account of the breakdown in relations between Army and Dakin.
"About a year before Japan entered the war, the Director-General of Engineer Services asked for advice concerning the camouflage of Larrakeyah Barracks at Darwin, whose shining roofs could be seen from the air at a distance of 50 miles. In the course of discussion it was decided that camouflage of establishments at Darwin would be unusually difficult and probably futile, because Japanese pearl-divers were already well acquainted with the area.
It was impossible to say just what effect this lack of preparation had on the severity of the Japanese attacks on Darwin, but it was realised that even adequate camouflage would have been only a small part of its defence. This conclusion was reinforced a few weeks later when large numbers of seasoned and experienced troops returned from the Middle East. Officers of the returning army were impressed with some of the elaborate efforts at camouflage they saw in South Australia, but with vivid memories of much-bombed cities in the Middle East where the presence or absence of camouflage seemed to have made little difference to the degree of devastation, they thought such efforts were out of proportion to the needs of the situation.
Dakin, resenting the opposition of the newly returned army leaders to many of the camouflage schemes, became critical of their judgment in these matters, and pointed out that the lessons of concealment learned in the Middle East were not always relevant to Australian conditions. The inevitable clash between army and civilian authorities came not over the question of who had the more experience but over the question of who should control camouflage activities. The army's real concern was with what it believed in the circumstances to be a serious waste of manpower on unnecessary camouflage schemes. This concern is reflected in the following instructions issued by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff to all commands:
ENGINEER POLICY—FIRST THINGS FIRST
It should be recognised that the Japanese expect AUSTRALIA to fall into their hands as readily as previous countries, and that therefore, until our resistance warrants it, they will not attack anything that may be of use to themselves, but will concentrate on the destruction of our Field Armies and anything that these Armies are immediately dependent upon.
In an effort to settle what was clearly a fundamental difference in policy the Department of Home Security on 7th July 1942 arranged a conference between the Secretary of the department, the Engineer-in-Chief (Maj-Gen C.S. Steele), the Technical Director of Camouflage (Prof. W. J. Dakin), and the Secretary, Department of the Army. The conference decided that the powers granted by clause 5c of the National Security (Camouflage) Regulations, whereby the Camouflage Committee was "to prepare or approve plans for camouflage schemes and to coordinate and control all such schemes", were too extensive to be acceptable to an army in the field. Two amendments were therefore proposed, and were approved by the War Cabinet in October 1942, which would restrain the committee from interfering with Service action on camouflage. The effect of these instructions was to make the Camouflage Section of the Department of Home Security a purely advisory body to the Services and to leave with it the responsibility for civil defence and for conducting investigations on the development of materials and schemes for camouflage. Each Service now assumed control over its policy on camouflage."
Note: Six days later Army approves new vehicle camo scheme (Light Earth disruptive, KG3 darkened) which supercedes and cancels all previous DHS schemes. New scheme enters vehicle production and Mech Circ 319 issued 28 July. Dakin gets wind of it and spits dummy – seeks immediate meeting with Army but gets the brush-off. Registers objections direct with Secretary Dept of Army. This chain of messages recorded below:
