[David_Hayward (RIP)]

I have extracted the following information from Major Stacey's report/diary and I thought that this might stimulate comment. I need to know exactly who sailed for France and when because 1. I am fascinated by the enterprise, 2. they lost a quantity, say 50, Ford F15s [from memory], and 3. this asepct has never been made widely known:

"The Germans, however, did not turn against England. They occupied the shell of Dunkirk on 4 June; and the next day they launched a terrific assault upon the main French armies in the region of the Somme. If France was to be saved from collapse it was now essential to provide a new British Expeditionary Force to support her. There were few British troops left upon her soil, but it was resolved to despatch from England such further divisions as were sufficiently trained and equipped for the purpose, and to send Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Brooke to take command. The Canadians' rôle now changed again; they suddenly found themselves back in Aldershot, where on 8 June they had the honour of another visit by Their Majesties the King and Queen; and within a few days they were moving out on their way to France. Again their hopes were high; they might, perhaps, be vouchsafed a share in saving the situation, even at the eleventh hour. The situation, unfortunately, was past saving. In the event, only the leading elements of the First Canadian Division - one infantry brigade with its attached technical units and some artillery - actually trod the soil of France. Most of these troops landed at Brest on the morning of 14 June - the day on which the Germans marched into undefended Paris. The infantry immediately entrained and began to move up country towards the centre of operations, while their transport came on by road. By the early morning of the 15th the trains were approaching the appointed divisional concentration area. The men aboard them had no idea whatever of what was happening beyond their own range of vision. In fact, however, a discussion on the 14th between Generals Weygand, Georges and Brooke had resulted in the agreed conclusion that since organized resistance by the main French armies was virtually at an end it was hopeless to think of holding out in Brittany with the forces still available; and that evening the Cabinet in London had decided to order the withdrawal of the British forces through Cherbourg and Brest. The Canadian movement then in progress was immediately put in reverse. The new orders reached the Canadian infantry battalions in the small hours of the morning, through the mouths of French railway transport officers on the moonlit platforms of stations far in the interior. There was temporary doubt of their authenticity (for in those days false orders were only too common); but confirmation was sought and obtained from competent authority, and the various trains started back towards the coast. That which had penetrated farthest, carrying the brigade headquarters and a well-known Highland regiment, received the instructions at Sable-sur-Sarthe, rather more than 200 miles by rail from Brest. The troops felt some uncertainty as to the disposition and intentions of the train crew; but a Highland captain took up his station in the engine-cab, provided with both red wine and ready cash for the purpose of influencing the driver (while in the event of these arguments failing, there were men with sub-machine-guns in the tender); and the journey began, with "all ranks keen and ready for trouble" and the 27-car train "a veritable travelling fortress". Thus they clanked on through the countryside, expecting momentarily to collide with a German armoured column: a little moving island of Canadian territory, with the Third French Republic falling into ruin all about it. As things turned out, they got through without mishap, though by no means by the route intended; for (in consequence, it appears, of some flustered railway official en route handing the train crew the wrong orders) they came out on the coast, not at Brest, but at St. Malo. Luckily, however, there was a British transport in the harbour; and on the 16th these troops found themselves back at Aldershot yet once more. They had been in France a little less than forty-eight hours. The other units were duly carried back to Brest and thence to England; and the divisional commander, who had received news of the orders countermanding the movement while at an English port preparing to embark, had the satisfaction, after a considerable period of anxiety, of hearing that the whole of his advanced brigade-group, and the gunners, were safely back on British soil. No other Canadian troops had actually sailed, though many had been aboard ship ready to sail when the new orders
were received.



This was then qualified:

1. On 5 June 1940 the 1st Cdn Inf Bde Group (then in the NORTHAMPTON area with the rest of the CANADIAN FORCE) was warned for a move back to ALDERSHOT on 6 June; the remainder of 1 Cdn Div was to follow on 7 June. These movements were the result of the contemplated move to France, which had resumably been determined upon in view of the new German offensive which had just opened there. The troops of 1 Cdn Div began to leave ALDERSHOT for the coast on the night of 11-12 June. On 7 June it had been decided that the Division would go to France in four convoys, sailing on 11, 13, 15 and 17 June; the balance of the non-divisional troops would follow in another convoy on 18 June. The Canadians were to form part of a Corps being created under the command of Lt.-Gen. BROOKE, the other divisions being the 51st, already in France, and the 52nd, "now en route" (7 June).
2. Certain advanced units, including the road party of 1 Field Regt., landed at BREST on 12 June; while the main body of 1 Cdn Inf Bde Group, .... disembarked at the same port on 14 June, the day on which it was decided to "put the movement in reverse". The infantry units were re-embarked at ST. MALO and BREST and sailed on 16 June, the Field Regt. sailed from BREST on 17 June. This latter unit received the order to withdraw while in billets at PARCE, 6 mi. N.-E. of SABLE. The infantry got the news while still entrained: the HASTINGS AND PRINCE EDWARD REGIMENT at LAVAL, the 48TH HIGHLANDERS at SABLE, while the ROYAL CANADIAN REGIMENT notes, "The actual point reached is doubtful but it is believed to have been CHATEAU BRIANT".

The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade Group got to France. The 1st Field Regt., R.C.A., grouped with the brigade for this operation, also crossed the Channel, and its road party was in France for five days. The infantry regiments involved were THE ROYAL CANADIAN REGIMENT, THE 48TH HIGHLANDERS OF CANADA, and THE HASTINGS AND PRINCE EDWARD REGIMENT......

On 2 July the Canadian Force moved to the GUILDFORD - WESTERHAM area, where 1 Cdn Div still remains (March 1941). I am told that these frequent moves led the Force to be labelled "McNaughton's Travelling Circus"".

Note that the Highlanders are mentioned but not the Toronto Regiment...did the latter embark on thew ship but were disembarked without sailing?


That said, Stacey wrote another report on 19 September 1941 which referred back to his original one and seems to have added more information. I have added that later report to my own and this is my draft:

"Further information states that after the German spearhead reached Abbeville on the Channel coast on 20 May, three days later the 1st Canadian Division ‘began to figure in the tactical picture’, and the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton went to France to examine the situation as the initial plan was to use a Brigade Group to reopen lines of communication with the armies in the north. On 24 May elements of the 1st Division actually embarked at Dover but with the ring closed and tightening on the armies falling back on Dunkirk, it was realised that the most urgent need was the defence of the mainland. Thus the troops disembarked and returned to Aldershot. On 26 May the plan of sending a Canadian Brigade Group to Dunkirk was revived, in order to help the withdrawal, and a move order was issued but countermanded a few hours later. On the 27th the plan was revived again, evidently the consequence of an appeal from Lord Gort and on that date the evacuation started. The same day saw the 1st Division along with ancillary troops receiving orders to move out of the training camp at Aldershot into an assembly area in the Northampton region ready to carry out its assigned role of defence of the British Isles, the plan being put into effect on 2 June. Then on 30 May, Churchill cabled Lord Gort, the B.E.F. commander with a note to be passed to the French that the U.K. would ‘build up a new B.E.F.’ with equipment for five divisions to include Canadian and Australian troops. By this time McNaughton had decided that the idea was foolish, and had resolved, if ordered to undertake the operation, to send as few troops as possible to make this ‘rather theatrical sacrifice’. On 5 June the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was warned for a move back to Aldershot the following day; the remainder of 1st Division was to follow on 7 June. These movements were the result of the contemplated move to France. On 7 June it had been decided that the Division would go to France in four convoys, sailing on 11, 13, 15 and 17 June; the balance of the non-divisional troops would follow in another convoy on 18 June. The Canadians were to form part of a Corps being created under the command of Lt.-Gen. Brooke the other divisions being the 51st, already in France, and the 52nd, ‘now en route. McNaughton never got beyond Plymouth. He had been informed that his Division would be concentrated in the close vicinity of Brest before moving up-country; and the first intimation he received that this plan had been changed was on 14 June. From 17 June the Canadians began to be evacuated from Brest, minus a considerable amount of supplies and vehicles which were destroyed. The destruction of the Canadian transport before re-embarkation was a source of great dissatisfaction to the Canadian troops and their commander. McNaughton made no particular secret of his dissatisfaction with the manner in which his troops were treated on this occasion. At a divisional conference on 20 June, McNaughton mentioned his dissatisfaction with the late events, but added that this incident was now over: the new task was resistance to an invasion ‘which may be attempted within the next few days’, and with a view to this function the Canadian Force was now in G.H.Q. Reserve, ‘a hard-hitting mobile force ready to proceed North, South, East or West’. However the delays in assembling and then delivering the vehicles gave rise to concerns and took time to make up. Their losses prejudiced the C.M.H.Q. planning for provision for the 2nd Division. The 1st Infantry Brigade Group which actually arrived in France, lost most of their M.T. and other equipment through destruction under orders before withdrawal. Of all the vehicles sent to the Continent, only 4,739 returned to England. The great majority of these had not been unloaded as they belonged to both the 52nd Division and 1st Canadian Division with a few saved by the 154th Brigade and the remainder represented those that had been loaded before the panic orders were received at the ports. The consequence was that when the Canadian Force moved to the Oxford area late in June, the units which had reached France were obliged to remain at Aldershot for re-equipment, and the force was thus one brigade group short. During the week ending 20 July, 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade and 1st Canadian Field Company moved to the Redhill area and returned to the order of battle. However 1st Canadian Field Regiment, 4the Canadian Ambulance and 1st Canadian Medium Regiment were still not included in the field force, the deficiencies now being mainly in M.T. In the course of the next few weeks the worst gaps were filled, and the 1st Canadian Division and the ancillary troops (now incorporated in 7 Corps) were in essentials prepared for battle. By then the 2nd Canadian Division were being landed".