[Mark W. Tonner]

Hi Norm/Art;

Reference: "Prior to Dieppe 50 members of the Carelton and York Regiment accompanied 4 Commando on a raid" - Part # 2:


The Canadian Party - was divided between two A.L.C.s., and was accompanied by an L.S.C. (L.S.C.2) in which was the Senior Naval Officer with Lt. Eyre's party accompanied by a military officer(Lt. L.B. Groom, CYR) whose function was to direct the first of the L.S.C. on to proper targets. An "R-boat" (R.154) was also attached to this group but was assigned to sounding duties and did not keep close company. In A.L.C 3 was Lt. Ensor with the Bridgehead party, including Lt. E.H. Snell, its commander; in A.L.C. 5 were the two patrols, Lt. W.Y. Smith being the senior military officer.

In the beginning considerable time was lost in assembling the little flotilla, as L.S.C. 2 had been towed by a different M.G.B. and could not immediately locate the other craft. Lt. Ensor reported, considered that in all "about 15 minutes" may have been wasted in this manner. Finally all the craft of the party were assembled and set out for the shore. The reports of the Canadian officers, however, indicate that the naval officers in charge of the vessels had difficulty in setting and keeping a course. Lt. GROOM's personal report, runs in part as follows: "The equipment of the S.L.C. is very poor. The compass on it always pointed South East regardless of the course and consequently the officer in charge was forced to use an army compass ... On the second attempt, when we left the M.G.B., we were given a bearing South 68 degrees East. We lost some time at the start because the officer could not see the numbers on the ring of the compass to set it. This I did for him and we set out. I started checking with my compass from the stern of the boat and found that we were generally quite a few degrees out. The magnetic attraction of these boats makes a compass act very peculiar".

Lt. Groom's report continues: "Soon after leaving the M.G.B., we heard gun-fire and very shortly after our stern seemed to be alight with tracers. At this point, the officer stopped the boat and tried to get the A.L.C. carrying the Bridgehead to pull along side and decide on a place to land. All the boats started going in a circle and it was then that we lost our other A.L.C.".

The A.L.C. which became separated from the other craft was that carrying Lt. Ensor and the Bridgehead party. A.L.C.5 and the L.S.C. succeeded in maintaining contact. On discovering that they were separated from the force commander, the two craft remaining in company began to search for his A.L.C. This search was unsuccessful. The party, in fact, was finally reunited only on returning to Dover.

Lt. Ensor's craft similarly carried on a search for the other two vessels. Its experience is described in Lt. Snell's report as follows: "We cruised about for some time searching for them but failed to locate them. Our motors were shut off while considering whether or not to make an independent landing. During this time, a rocket, which was to have been the signal to return to port, was fired from the Commando beach. Our craft then returned to port". Had both parties decided to go ashore independently, it would probably have resulted one party shooting up the other.

The experience of the two craft which remained together is graphically described in the report of Lt. W.Y. Smith: "With the flotilla complete, there seemed to be some doubt in the minds of the Naval personnel as to just where the beach lay, and at 0215hrs, I was under the impression that we were moving about in an ever widening circle, going in no general direction. At 0225hrs, there suddenly opened up a terrific amount of M.G. fire along with what seemed to be artillery fire from a direction about one mile to our South. I saw a rocket go up which looked to me to be the re-call rocket. On endeavouring to locate our force commander, Lt Ensor, I found that his craft was no longer with us. We then proceeded to search for A.L.C. 3. During this period, I saw a second rocket go up which I definitely identified as the re-call rocket. The Flotilla leader also agreed that it was the proper rocket. We decided that we would wait a while longer, hoping that the A.L.C. would turn up. During this time, the Germans were sending up a great many flares which illuminated the beaches, and were machine-gunning at random in our general direction. Searchlights were also quite active on the beach. By the light of the flares, I was able to discern that the portion of the coast which we were opposite, consisted of quite high chalk cliffs, and I estimated that we were about four miles north of our proper objective. At one period, we were drifting close to the beach, and fouled one propeller on the bottom. This left us with one engine with which to return to England. The Naval Officer in charge of my A.L.C. said that he did not like to go ashore with one propeller. At approximately 0350hrs, deciding that as one-half hour had elapsed since the rocket had gone up and as we found by wireless that the Commandos had also left the beach, we decided that the other A.L.C. would not turn up and we set course for England. Returning, we were trailed for a short period by a German "E" boat, but he was unable to locate us in the mist and darkness. At one period, we were in the focus of two German Searchlights but for some reasons, the Germans did not fire on us".

It is clear that, during the period when the Canadian party was offshore, there was fairly heavy enemy machine-gun fire, and some though not all of those present believed that German field artillery was also in action. Although Major Lovat's report makes no reference to the firing of the rocket which was the signal of recall the statement by his Adjutant, Lt. A.D.C. Smith leaves no doubt that it was actually fired as reported by the Canadian officers. The craft which had remained together clearly did not leave the coast until the fact that the Commando detachment had withdrawn was confirmed by wireless. "We hung around the coast quite close to shore and did not start for home until we heard over the 18 set that the Commandos were homeward bound" (Lt. Groom's report).

On the basis of Lieut. Snell's report it seems likely that the single A.L.C. withdrew from the area somewhat before the two craft still in company. It will be noted, on the basis of Lt. W.Y. Smith's report, that there is little doubt that the Canadian craft were brought to a position some miles north of the intended point of landing. The high ground referred to by Lt. Smith is presumably that in the area Nocquet-Equihenecault. The fact that Lt. Ensor did not see this high ground suggests that his A.L.C. was actually separated from the other craft by a very considerable distance during the period when the two portions of the party were mutually search for each other.

The German fire was evidently blind, and there were no Canadian casualties. Officers of both Canadian parties mention having seen enemy "E" boats but it seems probable that none of these vessels sighted the Canadian craft, and that no enemy fire was actually aimed at the latter.

The Reurn to Port - the naval force which had escorted the expedition across the Channel, and which had anchored at the dispersal point, came into contact with German light craft of 0200hrs, and, cutting anchor lines, engaged them(report of Lt-Cmdr. Cartwright). During the action which followed, our forces inflicted heavy damage on German vessels, probably sinking one, and themselves lost three men killed. The action carried the British M.G.B.s. out of the Hardelot area and there was no further contact between these M.G.B.s. and Lord Lovat's or Lt. Ensor's forces. The three craft carrying the Canadian party drew off from the French coast under their own power, and after covering a considerable distance encountered other British naval vessels off Dungeness in the early morning. Lt. Ensor's own A.L.C., after being towed for a time by an M.G.B., entered Dover harbour under its own power about 1000hrs on 22 Apr. The other two craft, having similarly encountered British motor gunboats were towed into Dover not long afterwards. Lt. Eyre's report states that L.S.C.2 reached Dover at 1115hrs. During the final period of the operation, after daylight, the R.A.F. provided fighter cover over the Straits, and there were no attacks by enemy aircraft.

*************************************************
Interview with Captain J.P. Ensor, Carleton and York Regiment

Canadian Military Headquarters 22 Jul 42

Subject: Operation "ABERCROMBIE", 22 Apr 42, and accompanying circumstances

Captain ENSOR called on the writer by request, with a view to clearing up certain points concerning "ABERCROMBIE" not fully dealt with in the documents.

Captain Ensor explained that on Friday, 3 Apr 42 (date from memory, assisted by consulting calendar) he met Major Lord LOVAT at the War Office, LONDON, and was told that he was going "on a raid" (locality not mentioned). The number of men and the type of equipment required was specified.

Captain Ensor believes that when this operation was offered to 1 Cdn Div, a unit of 3 Cdn Inf Bde was selected for it because 1 Cdn Inf Bde had been to France in June 1940, and troops of 2 Cdn Inf Bde had participated in the expedition to SPITZBERGEN.

On Tuesday, 7 Apr 42, Captain Ensor received his final instructions from Lord Lovat by telephone. In accordance with these, he and his detachment met Lord Lovat and his Commando party at PORTSMOUTH Station the following day, 8 Apr 42. These the combined force moved by M.T. to HYTHE, on the west shore of SOUTHAMPTON WATER, whence they were embarked upon H.M.S. "Prince Albert", on which they lived during the training period that followed.

This training was as realistic as it could be made, landings being carried out precisely as they would be in face of the enemy. Landings were made in the vicinities of NEEDS OAR POINT, STONE POINT and CALSHOT CASTLE on the NEW FOREST side of the SOLENT, and also on the ISLE OF WIGHT.

On Saturday, 18 Apr 42, the force moved to DOVER by M.T., arriving about midnight. Here they were quartered in DROP REDOUBT, an old (and dirty) moated work on the WESTERN HEIGHTS. The whole force, including Captain (then Lieutenant) Ensor himself, was locked up here and not permitted to go out. There was, however, one possible loophole in the system of security, as there was an Observer Corps post on the roof of the Redoubt, and its personnel were allowed to come and go. It was reported that people in DOVER were heard talking about Canadian having arrived to take part in a raid; and Captain Ensor believes that this was the only possible source of the information.

On Sunday, 19 Apr, there was a conference with the Naval authorities (the R.A.F. also being represented) at Naval Headquarters, DOVER, at which the details of the operation were discussed for the benefit of all concerned.

Captain Ensor mentioned that a very fine large-scale model of the area to be raided had been prepared, and that in general very complete intelligence material- including both air photographs and photographs of the village taken before the war - was provided. Both Lord Lovat and Captain Ensor attended this conference.

Before embarking for the operation, the CARLETON AND YORK detachment removed from their battle-dress blouses not only their 1 Cdn Div patches and their regimental flashes, but also their "CANADA" badges - which, Captain Ensor said, his men were very unwilling to "take down".

Captain Ensor said that he had turned in one copy of his own Operation Order for this unit's War Diary. This, however, was not placed upon the War Diary. He will try to trace it. In the mean-time, he summarized it briefly to the following effect:

a. While he himself remained in the bridgehead near the beach with a small reserve, Lieut. CROOK was to take a patrol out to the RIGHT (i.e. SOUTH) with a view to establishing a "flank block" and ambushing any enemy party approaching the shore by the secondary road from NEUFCHATEL. At Zero plus 60' he would attack and clear a wired enemy position which had been located near the shore on this flank; and

b. Simultaneously Lieut. SMITH with the other patrol would operate on the other flank. He would move inland to a small wood (not shown on map) near HARDELOT, reconnoitring the dunes (for passage by A.F.Vs., etc) en route. He would after reconnaissance plan on attack on a large warehouse on the outskirts of the village near the shore, air photographs showed a pillbox on the roof of this building. He was also to investigate another warehouse near the station. This attack was to be made at Zero plus 60'. His party was equipped with 12 incendiary bombs and 100 incendiary bullets for firing the buildings. After delivering his attack, he was to ambush any enemy parties arriving to fight the fires, and to retire to the bridgehead by way of the shore, shooting up any opposition encountered.

Captain Ensor confirms that the actual strength of the CARLETON AND YORK detachment engaged in the operation was 50 all ranks. This included eight officers (Lieuts. ENSOR, FARTHING (with bridgehead), SNELL (commanding bridgehead), SMITH (No. 1 Patrol), CROOK (No. 2 Patrol), THORNTO(Beachmaster), and GROOM (in L.S.C. with Navy, not to land), and Capt Ian S. MacLEAN, R.C.A.M.C. (Medical Officer). The remainder of his party (which was detailed in nominal roll in unit War Diary amounted to seven officers - M.O. not shown - one W.O. 1, and 60 other ranks) was left behind in DROP REDOUBT. Three of the men detailed to remain behind fell in with the raiding party with full equipment, but were detected and sent back; there was simply no room for more than the prescribed number.

As described in documents, the first attempt at carrying out the operation (night 19/20 Apr) was abandoned after an A.L.C. sank in tow. The operation itself was carried out on the night of 21/22 Apr, the sea being calm but visibility reduced by mist. The naval officer who had worked with Captain Ensor during training was not present for the operation and those naval officers who were present with the Canadian party were junior and inexperienced officers of the R.N.V.R. To this, and to the inefficiency of the compasses with which the light craft were equipped, Captain Ensor attributed the blame for the craft carrying the Canadian party being brought to the wrong part of the coast and becoming separated. In consequence of these misfortunes, none of the Canadians got ashore.

Captain Ensor stated that the raiding party was accompanied by, in all, four motor gunboats. Of these only one was with his own party. The transfer into A.L.C.s took place possibly 2-1/2 miles from the French coast, possibly a little less.

The naval forces suffered some casualties in personnel during their action with enemy craft. The only military casualty was a Commando soldier wounded as the result of no answering a British challenge.

Captain Gordon WEBB, commanding the Commando patrol charged with the duty of destroying the searchlight post, told Captain Ensor that his party had cut through the wire surrounding this post at the time when the recall rocket was fired. He also said that as a result of the action of the sand on automatic weapons, at this time the only weapon in his patrol able to fire was an automatic pistol.

On the return voyage to England, Captain Ensor said, no further contact was made with the M.G.B.s. which had taken party across the Channel, but it was picked up by British vessels of a similar but somewhat larger type on patrol in the Straits. Captain Ensor's own craft, after being towed for a short time, was cast off and entered DOVER harbour about 1000 hrs on 22 Apr under its own power. The other two Canadian craft were towed in together
between 1000 and 1030 hrs.

Captain Ensor stated that relations between his detachment and the men of the Commando detachment were excellent, and he go on very well with Lord Lovat, who, he thinks, well deserved the M.C. which he has since received. Relations with the Naval personnel were also satisfactory during training but the operation itself, in the circumstances, left the Canadians feeling that the Navy were responsible for their disappointment.

Captain Ensor made the remark that his men would welcome the opportunity to participate in an "all-Canadian" operation, involving Canadian Naval as well as military forces.

He spoke with satisfaction of the morale of his men during the operation, mentioning in particular that when firing began he instructed his Bren gunners to mount their guns on the gunwale of the A.L.C. and that there upon every man in the craft immediately rose up, forsaking cover, in the hope of exchanging shots with the enemy. An enemy E-boat did come close enough to be fired upon, but Captain Ensor did not allow his men to open fire for fear of disclosing their position. He believes their craft was not seen.

Captain Ensor himself did not hear or see artillery firing from the shore during the operation, though some witnesses believe that enemy field guns were in action.

C.P.S.
(C.P. Stacey) Major
Historical Officer

22 Jul 42

Part # 3 to follow.