[David_Hayward (RIP)]

Lang, have a read of my online research paper:

http://www.gmhistorian.btinternet.co...IANDOLLARS.htm

I am wading through papers now not touched for years. This the thing: you note verything down at the time and then nin due course, armed with more information from other sources, it begind to make more sense or answers queries that were not resolved previously.

Whilst I beaver away here's two titbits to make you think:

a) From a 27th June 1940 Memo:

[Colonel N.O.] Carr had also been informed by GM of Canada that they had received an inquiry from Australia for 1,900 4 x 4 “National Defence specification” and was asked what reply GM should give. He claimed he was at a loss to give any constructive advice. This approach plus the British order emphasised the need to “get into maximum production as soon as possible and maintain peak production until the tap is turned off”

My comments in a footnote were:

Note also that the Australian Government were seeking Canadian supplies by direct approach, well before the Ministry of Supply allocated British orders to that Dominion and before they received deliveries destined for Singapore and Malaya that were diverted. The British also make reference to the existing agreement for the purchase of the complete Australian and New Zealand wool clip. It is queried as to how the Canadians were to be paid by way of barter, as a consequence, and therefore were the Canadians happy to accept Australian pounds, which the Americans would not be so accommodating about?

However, may I go off-topic and add these nuggets before I lose the plot:

The trickling tap, though, was possibly suddenly to be fully opened: despite the mistaken belief that the British requirements had to be satisfied from the U.S., there was a change in attitude by mid-July possibly as the shortage of U.S. dollars was noted! In a letter of 31 July 1940 from Carr to the Department of Munitions and Supply “the British” had made a further enquiry regarding the possible production of 39,200 additional vehicles! Consequently Carr queried as to whether the tooling contemplated for 200 vehicles per day was sufficient and the motor industry should review the situation to see whether bottlenecks at that production rate could be relieved with advantage, though they might not be able to do so until tooling for 100 units/day had advanced beyond the state at that time. Carr thought that the aim was 100 units/day but under pressure 125 could be achieved. However, spare parts demand for large orders shortly beforehand was such that the 100 units/day completed vehicles could only be maintained if the outside limit of 125 sets of components could also be maintained As this would preclude elasticity or buffer in production, he suggested that the companies decide whether they could create some reserve capacity greater than then contemplated

b) Priority changed by even mid-August 1940 even whilst the BofB was raging, and thought was being given to the Mid-East as well as the invasion of Europe in 1942:

The requirement to supply the Middle East with vehicles clashed with that of the Canadians’ need to supply their 2nd Division that were beginning to arrive in the United Kingdom, and the problem of equipping them proved a very difficult one. On 20th August 1940 Lieutenant-General McNaughton wrote to the Senior Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters, expressing concern at the supply of equipment for the Division and ancillary troops. He said it appeared to be impossible ‘to obtain either the necessary equipment or any assurance as to when it will be made available; this seems to be due to the apparent division of responsibility of allotment between the War Office and G.H.Q. Home Forces. I feel that the time has arrived when we must insist on positive information and, if no definite assurance of supply of equipment can be given by the War Office, we should consider advising Canada against the despatch of any additional troops to this country until they can be equipped properly’. The Senior Officer was requested to arrange for a meeting ‘with representatives of the War Office who can speak with authority on this matter’. The consequence was a meeting at the War Office on 30th August attended on behalf of Canada and the War Office. General Carr of the W.O. explained that ‘equipment must be placed where it is most needed’ and that large consignments to the Middle East were necessary. To meet these requirements it had been necessary to stop issues to units at home. No Bofors guns were available in England except for A.D.G.B. (Air Defences of Great Britain); all others were going to Haifa and Alexandra. The British officers further mentioned that ‘about 12 divisions are the most that can be maintained in the Middle East owing to transportation and other problems’, and that ‘24 Divisions are in England now in various stages of being equipped’. McNaughton remarked that in view of the information given him he had grave doubts as to whether additional Canadian formations should be sent from Canada in the spring of 1941. However, despite re-allocation of resources to the Middle East, during the early part of 1941 the equipment situation of the 2nd Division improved slowly as a result of increasing Canadian production and provision was made for the 3rd Canadian Division that arrived in the U.K. in the summer of 1941 much better equipped than its predecessors.